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After two civil wars and a health epidemic destroyed most of Liberia’s economy, paths
to the country’s recovery and growth have seldom been studied in the economics literature.
This dissertation contains three chapters on topics around a particular factor of growth:
the private sector. The first two chapters address the freight transport sector in Liberia.
Understanding how and at what cost commodities are transported intra-nationally is key to
promote sustainable growth. The third chapter explores the tender process, and how it can
be made more efficient.
In Chapter 1, I study the introduction of a new technology in Liberia’s transport sector.
While standard economic theory predicts that the introduction of a monitoring device should
increase the productivity of the worker, I show that this is not necessarily the case. I use an
experiment where I introduce a monitoring technology on trucks to measure the impact of
the technology on the worker. I find three main results. First, the technology had an overall
positive effect on the drivers who received the technology. Second, the managers choose to
install the technology only on the drivers they trust the least. Third, the technology had
an adverse effect on the drivers at the margin. These results are consistent with a theory
of intrinsic motivation. The key insight of the model is that monitoring workers crowds out
their intrinsic motivation to work hard. If a driver is intrinsically motivated, monitoring him
may have adverse effects on the effort he provides. This chapter is the first evidence from
the field of the adverse effect of a monitoring device. The results provide evidence that a
blind application of monitoring devices to the entire worker-base may produce suboptimal
effects and that managers seem on average to be able to identify the workers who are not
intrinsically motivated.
In Chapter 2, I propose an estimation of Liberia’s intra-national trade costs, and shed
light on why these estimates are so high. Using data on Liberia’s commodity prices, I
estimate how trade costs vary with distance. I find that estimated trade costs per distance
are significantly bigger in Liberia than they are in other countries. I then use data from a
survey of transport companies to estimate travel times. Trade costs per travel time — and
not per distance – are still bigger in Liberia than they are in other countries, but to a lower
extent than trade costs per distance. I conclude that the speed of vehicles, which captures
road-specific characteristics such as road quality, explains a significant share of the difference
in trade costs between Liberia and other countries.
Chapter 3 evaluates the effect of a training program that teaches firms how to apply to
tenders. We show that firms who took such a training increased the number of contracts won
as well the quality of those contracts. However the impact of this training is heterogenous
across firms. We explore the heterogeneity of the impact along expected discrimination.
Firms who believe that they are being discriminated against often have lower chances of
winning tenders. These firms also accumulate less experience in applying to contracts, and
could therefore benefit more from the training. Results show that the effect of the training
is a non-monotonic function of expected discrimination. For firms in the low ranges of ex-
pected discrimination, the effect of the training counter-balances the effect of higher expected
discrimination. In higher ranges of expected discrimination, the effect of higher expected
discrimination dominates and more discriminated firms are less likely to provide additional
effort in response to the training. We conclude that the firms who benefit from the program
are not the most discriminated firms but the ones in the middle of the distribution.
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Chapter 1
Monitoring and Intrinsic Motivation:
Evidence from Liberia’s Trucking
Firms
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Severe information asymmetries are thought to make contracting particularly difficult within
(and across) firms in developing countries. Increasingly available and affordable monitoring
technologies have the potential to greatly reduce such assymetries. Standard principal-agent
theory predicts that these technologies should raise worker effort. However, increased moni-
toring may also undermine informal arrangements that have developed exactly to substitute
for the effort incentives provided by formal contracting institutions. If so, the impact of
modern monitoring technologies on worker effort is theoretically ambiguous.
In this paper, I study both a firms’ decision of whether to employ a new monitoring tech-
nology and the corresponding impact on worker effort. I present results from an experiment
in the context of Liberia’s trucking industry. The treatment offered managers the opportu-
nity to install GPS tracking devices on randomly selected trucks at zero cost. The devices
allow managers (principals) to better monitor drivers (agents) by reporting the position of
trucks in real time. I first show how installed devices affect drivers’ speeds without leading
to higher accident rates or maintenance costs. I then present a simple model that illustrates
how the level of effort provided by the worker with no monitoring can alter managers’ optimal
monitoring decisions across workers. Finally, I test the model’s predictions by analyzing (i)
which workers managers choose to monitor, (ii) the heterogeneity of the effect of monitoring
across drivers, and (iii) whether monitoring can adversely affect the effort of some workers.
Liberia’s trucking industry is an ideal setting in which to study firms’ monitoring choices
and worker effort for several reasons. First, the combination of dirt roads and heavy rains
makes route completion times variable and unpredictable. This unpredictability means that
drivers can easily shirk without raising suspicion. Second, drivers take a set of decisions
that affect the firm’s performance, and that the manager cannot observe perfectly. These
include the number and length of breaks, and whether to transport additional goods or
2
individuals without the manager’s approval. In the absence of a monitoring technology, the
only information a manager can use to try to infer such driver “input” choices are “outputs”
such as the total travel time.2
I conducted the experiment on a sample of 150 trucks based in Liberia’s main transport
hubs. GPS tracking devices were offered free of charge.3 The devices send the real-time
positions of trucks to an online server through a mobile network.4 Managers can then access
the online server on a computer or smartphone.5 The role of the GPS tracking devices and
the managers’ ability to track the truck was clearly explained to drivers at baseline.6
Evidence from the experiment shows that monitored drivers completed their tasks 58
percent faster. This occurs in part because monitored drivers take shorter breaks,7 but do
not have more accidents or higher truck maintenance costs. These results hold whether
managers’ or drivers’ estimates of speed and break times are used.8
Despite the dramatic improvement in monitored drivers’ performance, take-up of the
2Managers were unable to effectively align incentives of drivers with the firm’s objectives before the
experiment. Only two trucks in the sample used GPS trackers before the experiment. The literature has
shown that performance pay may increase incentives of employees (e.g. Jensen and Murphy, 1990; Foster
and Rosenzweig, 1994; Lazear, 2000; Lavy, 2009; Muralidharan and Sundararaman, 2011). However, only 21
percent of the truck drivers in the sample receive performance pay, and for these drivers the variable part of
their pay only represents less than 5 percent of their total wage. While this might seem surprising at first,
a risk-averse worker may not agree to be performance paid in a case where many factors affect the output
and are out of his control. In fact, when asked if they would like a performance-pay, the drivers answered
that they would find it unfair.
3The mechanic’s salary and proper guidance to use the device also were provided.
4The combination of mobile networks used by the GPS tracking devices covers most of the road network,
ensuring that the position of the truck is precisely reported at all times.
5Most of the managers in the study own or have access to a smartphone or computer.
6Not informing the drivers about the GPS tracking devices would have put drivers at risk of being
reprimanded or disciplined by their managers.
7Estimated breaks are times when the driver stops for being stuck in the mud, for deliveries or for personal
reasons.
8GPS tracking devices are only installed on trucks of the treatment group, so the data collected by the
devices cannot be used for measuring treatment effects. The estimates presented in this paper are based on
interviews with drivers and managers.
3
monitoring devices was far from complete through the end of my data collection, a year after
the start of the experiment. Managers chose not to install the devices on 35 percent of the
trucks selected for treatment.
I show that incomplete take-up is consistent with a model of intrinsic motivation. Build-
ing on Bénabou and Tirole (2006), an intrinsically motivated agent provides effort irrespec-
tive of her extrinsic incentives to do so and values the principal’s belief about her motivation
for providing effort. The key insight of the model is that, while increased monitoring provides
additional extrinsic incentives to provide effort, it does so at the cost of reducing a worker’s
ability to signal that she does not need such explicit incentives to work hard. Monitoring
can therefore crowd out effort for workers who value the principal’s opinion so much that
the additional incentives from monitoring are outweighed by the workers’ reduced ability to
signal their “type”.
The model predicts that the higher a worker’s baseline effort, the lower the performance
benefits from monitoring will be; the effect on performance might become negative for high
levels of effort. I show three pieces of evidence that provide empirical support for this
interpretation of my findings and the particular form of worker motivation that generates
the model’s predictions.
First, I show that managers decide to install GPS tracking devices on the trucks of
drivers who perform less well at baseline. Drivers who receive a GPS tracking device ex ante
complete their routes less fast, are more likely to have accidents, and are more likely to break
the rules set out by their managers.9 Additionally, managers report worse relationships10
at baseline with the drivers they later decided to monitor. These drivers are typically from
9At baseline, managers were asked which rules they clearly asked the drivers to follow. These rules include
“do not carry unauthorized passengers or goods” and “do not use the truck for personal reasons”.
10Managers are asked to rate their relationships with a particular driver on a scale from 0 to 10.
4
another county than the manager.11
Second, the treatment effect on speed for monitored drivers is greater the lower the
performance of the driver at baseline. Drivers who at baseline complete their routes fast,
and are better at following the rules of the business, show little to no effect of the monitoring
device on performance.
Third, the treatment effect on measures of performance that are not directly monitored
by the GPS tracker is adverse for drivers who provided high levels of effort at baseline.
Monitoring the drivers significantly decreased the propensity of these drivers to follow the
rules of the business and to take good care of their trucks. Additionally, the drivers who
provided high levels of effort at baseline reported a significant deterioration in their job
satisfaction and in their relationship with the managers after monitoring was introduced.
These last two pieces of evidence support the model’s prediction that the more the driver
provides effort at baseline, the lower the benefits from monitoring. They also suggest that
monitoring such drivers would be counter-productive for the firm which helps explain why
managers on average choose not to install monitoring devices on such drivers’ trucks. This
evidence that Liberian managers on the whole accurately judge which workers to monitor –
the combination of the first and second two pieces of evidence – is important: it suggests
that simply making monitoring technologies available can increase firm productivity.12 It
also increases our confidence that the model of intrinsic motivation provides an accurate
characterization of Liberian trucking firms’ challenges.
Overall, this paper demonstrates that, while monitoring technologies can dramatically
increase the productivity of certain drivers, their use may be counter-productive for other
workers. Thus, blind application of monitoring devices to the entire worker-base may produce
11County of origin plays a role similar to ethnic group in Liberia.
12Evidence suggests that management choices are not always optimal in developing countries (Bloom et al.,
2013). My findings show that in choosing which drivers they wanted to monitor, managers on average made
the optimal choice.
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a suboptimal effect on overall productivity, contrary to the predictions of classical principal-
agent theory. This paper contributes to literatures on the agency problem in the workplace,
on the adverse effect of incentives, on contingent management and on the understanding of
high transport costs in developing countries.
An existing literature on the agency problem has shown that information asymmetries
in the workplace can in some contexts partly be overcome with informal arrangements, such
as relational contracts (e.g. Greif, 1993; Brown et al., 2004; Macleod, 2007; Macchiavello
and Morjaria, 201513). In this paper, I study how monitoring can help solve a key agency
problem when informal arrangements fail. This relates to the literature specifically on the
effect of monitoring on an agent’s effort. Monitoring has been shown to have a positive effect
on the performance of workers in different contexts in developing countries, such as health
care provision (Björkman and Svensson, 2009) or education (Duflo et al., 2012).14
The line of work that is the closest to this project is the work by George Baker and
Thomas Hubbard. In several papers (Hubbard, 2000, 2003; Baker and Hubbard, 2003, 2004)
they study the impact of the introduction of On-Board Computers (OBCs)15 in trucking
companies in the Unites States. The authors use historical data to show that the introduction
of the technology helped solve the moral hazard issue within trucking companies, that it
changed resource allocation inside the firm and truck-ownership incentives. My work differs
from theirs in that in addition to directly measuring effort,16 I study the introduction of
13Greif (1993) shows that Maghribi traders in the 11th century relied on a reputation mechanism to counter
asymmetric information and limited contract liability. Brown et al. (2004) show that relational contracts
emerge in the absence of third party enforcement contracts. Macleod (2007) presents a survey of formal
and informal mechanisms. Macchiavello and Morjaria (2015) show that in the Kenyan rose export industry,
buyers rely on the reputation to overcome poor contract enforceability.
14This has also been shown in developed countries, for example (Jackson and Schneider, 2015) show that
monitoring has a positive impact on the effort of workers in auto repair shops.
15GPS tracking devices are a particular case of OBCs. OBCs can be more sophisticated, and in some cases
are able to provide additional information than the position of the truck, such as fuel and battery levels, or
other measures of driver performance.
16They show that trucking companies are more likely to use GPS tracking devices when information
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monitoring in a setting where informal arrangements partially substitute for formal contract
enforcing institutions. This is important because in such settings monitoring may undermine
informal arrangements and may be counter-productive. In the context of this study I find
counter-productive effects of monitoring that were not considered in previous literature.
In that respect, this paper adds to the literature on motivational crowding out and
adverse effects of extrinsic incentives. Models explaining the possibility of adverse effect of
incentives were developed in theoretical papers, such as Bénabou and Tirole (2003), Sliwka
(2007) and Ellingsen and Johannesson (2008).17 In this paper, I follow Bénabou and Tirole
(2006). While existing studies18 document motivational crowding out in blood donations
(Mellström and Johannesson, 2008), day-care pick-ups (Gneezy and Rustichini, 2000a), and
the lab (Falk and Kosfeld, 2006; Dickinson and Villeval, 2008; Békir et al., 2015; Belot and
Schröder, 2016), there is to my knowledge no existing evidence on its implications for firms19.
My findings suggest two things: (i) monitoring employees can crowd out their effort and
(ii) managers are aware of and act on the phenomenon. In this regard, this paper contributes
to the literature on contingent management practices. The employer-worker relation and how
optimal management practices are affected by this relation is studied by Blader et al. (2016).
assymetries are particularly strong (when perquisite-taking is attractive to drivers, driver effort is important,
and verifying drivers’ actions to insurers is valuable). Using direct measured of effort, I show that using GPS
tracking devices increases the effort of drivers.
17In the case were the principal has private information about the task to be performed by the agent,
Bénabou and Tirole (2003) show that incentives can adversely impact an agent’s perception of the task or of
his abilities, and act as negative reinforcers in the long run. In the model described by Sliwka (2007), some
agents are “conformists” and will adhere to the social norm. By choosing to trust the agent, the principal
can signal her conviction that most people are fair. On the other, if she chooses to control the agent, she
reveals her pessimism about the social norm and this may lead conformists to become selfish. Ellingsen and
Johannesson (2008) show that if there are different types of principals, those that are worth impressing, and
those that are not, choosing to monitor or not (or to give incentives or not) is a signal about the type of the
principal.
18See Frey and Jegen (2000) for a survey of empirical evidence in the fields of both economics and psy-
chology.
19Gneezy and Rustichini (2000b) show that paying high-school students to do voluntary work can crowd
out their effort. That I know of, this is the closest evidence in the literature on the adverse effect of incentives
in an employer-employee relationship.
7
In my study, managers based their decision to monitor drivers or not on their relationship
with drivers. This confirms the findings of Grund and Harbring (2013), who show that in an
employment relationship, control is negatively correlated with trust20. Atkin et al. (2017)
study how contracts’ incentives affect the firm’s decision to adopt a technology. Here, this
decision is based on the relationship of trust between a manager and the employee.
Finally, this paper relates to the literature on transport costs. Authors have shown that
transport costs are high in developing countries, particularly in Africa (Teravaninthorn and
Raballand, 2009). Atkin and Donaldson (2015) and Bergquist (2016) use a new method to
estimate trade costs from commodity prices and shed light on the role of intermediaries to
explain high transport costs. Lall et al. (2009) show how bad roads and low competition in
the transport sector contribute to high transport costs. This paper is the first to document
the role of moral hazard in explaining high transport costs.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the context of the experiment,
section 3 details the experimental design and Section 4 describes the effect of the treatment
on treated drivers. Section 5 describes the model and the predictions it entails. Section 6
presents empirical evidence that supports the predictions of the model. Section 7 concludes.
1.2 Background
Liberia’s trucking industry is particularly prone to asymmetries of information between
drivers and managers.
20Grund and Harbring (2013) define trust as measured by the trust question: “Generally speaking, would
you say that most people can be trusted or that you can’t be too careful in dealing with people?”.
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1.2.1 Liberia
In the early nineteenth century, thousands of freed African-Americans emigrated from the
United States to the African continent. They arrived on the continent’s West Coast and
created Africa’s first independent republic: Liberia. In 2003, after decades of civil war,
Charles Taylor, a prominent warlord, was ousted from power, ending one of Africa’s most
violent wars. The 2005 elections were won by the continent’s first woman president, Ellen
Johnson Sirleaf.
Since the end of the war, Liberia’s economy, which was entirely put to the ground during
the war, has been slowly recovering. More than 200,000 Liberian refugees who had fled the
war came back to their homeland. As a result of the war, Liberia’s economy is very young.21
Workers - who have either fought or lived in refugee camps during the war - are often not
well educated.
Trust in the government’s stability was slowly restored22, but the country still suffers
from poor institutions. Corruption is said to be common at any levels of the government
and it is difficult to bring a disagreement to court. Often no formal contract is signed between
employers and workers23, and in most cases workers are hired under a verbal agreement.
In such a context, managers rely extensively on their personal networks to hire employees.
Liberia is divided into fifteen different counties, and while close to one quarter of Liberians
live in Monrovia, the capital, most of them identify themselves as originating from one of the
fifteen counties. Liberians originating from the same county are more likely to have family
or friends in common, and it is common for firms to hire employees in such networks.
21According to a 2013 census, a minority of businesses operating today were already operating before the
war. In 2013 businesses had been operating for an average of 5.7 years.
22In 2016, foreign investments had come back to their pre-war levels.
23In the rare cases where contracts are signed, a third person known to both parties signs as well to ensure
enforcement.
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1.2.2 The transport industry in Liberia
Liberia is connected to the international market through its main port of entry based in
the capital, Monrovia, where most trucking companies are based. These companies find
clients (mainly traders or producers), distribute imported goods to inland markets and collect
local goods for international exports. A few other companies operate from other cities,
mainly transporting goods that are locally produced and consumed. Since railroads and
maritime routes do not exist for transporting containers24, road transport is the only mode
of transportation.
However, Liberia’s road network is not well developed (see the lower panel of figure 1.1
for a map of Liberia’s main roads).25 The country’s main axis connects the three main cities
but still leaves a large share of the population unconnected to a paved road.26 Liberia ranks
14th in terms of average rainfall per year.27 As a result, vehicles get often stuck in the mud
during strong rains.
The combination of heavy rains and dirt roads makes travel times very variable and
transport companies have a hard time predicting the time it will take for goods to be deliv-
ered.28
24Only one railroad is still operating in Liberia, but the mining company who restored it after the war
has a monopoly over its use. Liberia has four ports (Monrovia, Buchanan, Harper and Greenville), and
Monrovia’s Freeport is the only one to be fully equipped for container and cargo handling.
25On the map of figure 1.1, the width of roads is proportional to their state, where 0 is a very damaged
road and 10 is an all-season paved road.
26According to the World Bank, only 11% of the population is connected to a an all-season paved road.
27World Bank average precipitation in depth (mm/year).
28In contracts between transport companies and their clients, very few stipulate a date of arrival. Most of
the clients pay a flat rate for the goods to be delivered in a “timely manner”.
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1.2.3 Information asymmetries in trucking firms
Information asymmetries arise when managers are not able to perfectly monitor workers.
When trucks leave the parking lot, managers are not able to know precisely the location of
the truck until it reaches its destination.29 During that time, drivers choose the speed of the
truck, the number and length of breaks without managers being able to see or control these
decisions.
Discussions with the managers before the beginning of the experiment revealed different
approaches to monitoring drivers prior to the experiment. Most of the managers I talked to
mentioned that they couldn’t rely on any information, and as such had no choice but to trust
their drivers. To keep track of where the goods are, most managers require their drivers to
call them regularly and update them on their position. There are three network providers
in Liberia, which together cover almost entirely the road network, but separately each one
only covers some areas. A truck driver, who often relies on only one network, lacks a signal
in some sections of the journey. This provides him with a great reason to not continuously
update his manager on the location of the truck (or to avoid answering the phone). Another
obvious issue with this approach is that even in the case in which he can get in touch with
the driver, the manager is not able to confirm the information that he is given.30
Very few companies used GPS tracking devices prior to the experiment. Information
and cost barriers combined with the poor development of the mobile network contribute to
the low take-up of the technology in the past. Local GPS trackers are expensive31 and have
29Once the truck reached the destination, the client can confirm he received the goods.
30One manager said he had developed a system to monitor his driver. He had asked businesses on the
road – managed by family, or friends – to watch the road and notify him when the truck went by. While
this approach could in theory solve at least in part the agency problem, it requires an extensive network of
friends and family along the road, and to trust the businesses giving the information.
31A quick survey of the local options for GPS trackers determined that the cheapest device available in
Liberia is priced at US$ 1,500.
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not proven to be fully functioning, in part because the mobile network necessary to use the
device has been very slow to develop and until recently did not cover the main roads. At
baseline, only 25% of managers knew what a GPS tracker was before the interview.
In other contexts, information asymmetries have been shown to be at least partially solved
with performance pay. In the context of trucking companies, performance paid drivers have
a wage based on the time they take to complete a trip, the number of trips completed per
month, or other observable measures of performance. Only 21 percent of the drivers in my
sample received a wage based on performance, and for these drivers the variable part of their
wage only represents less than 5 percent of their total wage. While this might seem surprising
at first, a risk-averse worker may not agree to be paid on performance in a case where many
factors affect the output and are out of his control. In fact, when asked if they would like to
be paid based on their performance, drivers answered that they would find it unfair. In the
point of view of the manager, performance pay may not be optimal: providing incentives to
drivers for one factor of effort, such as the total travel time, might distort drivers’ incentives
on other factors, such as taking good care of the truck.32
In the past, managers have not been able to perfectly align drivers’ incentives with the
optimal actions for the benefits of the firm. The experiment I describe in the next section
measures to what extent the introduction of a monitoring device solves the agency problem.
1.3 Experimental Design
In this section I describe the recruitment of trucking companies, the randomization of the
treatment and its implementation as well as the data collection. The empirical evidence on
the effect of the treatment is presented in the following section.
32This multi-tasking interpretation was developed by Holmstrom and Milgrom (1991).
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1.3.1 Sample of Companies
Firms were recruited in the sample using a combination of different methods.
1. The Liberian Business Registry (LBR) provided the contact information of 57 firms
registered under the freight transport sector. These included different types of firms
(not only trucking) such as customs clearing.33 The list only included businesses that
had been registered at one point including businesses that had already closed. Most
of the businesses on this list were either closed, not in the trucking business or not
reachable34.
2. Building Markets - an NGO that works with more than 3,000 Liberian businesses -
has a publicly available directory of firms by sector, with their contact information.35
3. The majority of the firms were recruited directly at the main transport hubs. Enumer-
ators were assigned to different areas in Monrovia, and sometimes travelled to other
cities36. At transport hubs, they either directly talked to managers, or asked drivers
for the contact information of their manager.37
4. Monrovia has a Port Trucker Union that brings together small trucking companies
that have access to the port’s container unloading area. Contact was made with the
transport union and I was invited to a meeting that gathered around 50 drivers and
33When they register, businesses are asked what sector they are in and LBR never verifies that sector.
This leads to businesses being registered under wrong categories.
34That I know of, LBR’s contact information of businesses is never updated which results in many contact
information being obsolete.
35Building Market’s contact information of firms is regularly updated.
36Enumerators were sent to four other cities to recruit firms: Ganta, Saclepea, Saniquellie and Karnplay.
37At this point, the drivers were not informed about the GPS trackers. They were told that I was
conducting a study on the trucking industry. Enumerators did not report any driver who refused to give out
the contact information of the owner of the truck, or other superior.
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managers. Enumerators had the opportunity to explain the project and took the
contact information of interested managers. While this method seemed to be working,
some of the managers were contacted later, were skeptical and later refused to answer
interviews. According to local informal discussions, it appeared that some firms in
that group thought I was working with the government.
5. Lastly, enumerators asked the firms they had recruited for contact information of other
firms in their sector. Some firms were able to point us to other firms they knew, but
at this point we already had the contact information of most of these firms.
All the firms that had at least one truck were given the opportunity to participate in the
study. Out of the 76 firms for which we had contact information of, 62 agreed to participate
in the experiment (82%). These 62 companies represent 152 trucks and 160 drivers38. Since
there is no census of trucking companies in Liberia, it is hard to know what share of the
universe of trucking companies the sample represents, but I am confident that it represents
a significant share.39
Table 3.1 presents summary statistics. 98% of drivers are always assigned to the same
truck, which means that in most cases the treatment — which is assigned at the truck level —
corresponds to the driver level. A “trip” is defined as the journey from origin to destination
(the return journey is not considered as being part of the trip). On average, trips in the
sample last 26 hours, a little more than a day, but the time spent on a trip varies a lot across
trips. The average speed of drivers at baseline (which took place during the rainy season) is
18 kilometers per hour (around 11 miles per hour). However, this only reflects the average
speed of trucks during the rainy season, and the average speed of the control group during
the dry season is significantly higher, at 28 kilometers per hour.
38Here, only drivers that are not managers are counted. These are the drivers of interest for the experiment.
39According to Dablanc (2010), Mali had 1,864 trucks in 2006, or 0.13 trucks per thousand people or 0.35
trucks per $ million GDP. Scaled to Liberia in 2016, this is equivalent to 600-735 trucks.
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1.3.2 Treatment
Trucks in the treatment group were randomly assigned a GPS tracker.
1.3.2.1 Randomization
The treatment was rolled out in two phases.
The first phase took place in August 2016, when firms were recruited. At that point truck
owners40 were asked to sign a Memorandum of Understanding giving the authorization to
install GPS tracking devices on the trucks in his company.41 Managers and drivers were then
interviewed, and upon completion of the interviews of all manager and drivers of a company,
the company’s trucks were randomly assigned to treatment and control groups, according to
the following procedure:
1. Each firm was assigned a random share of trucks to be treated, with an average across
firms of 2/3 of treated trucks.42
2. Within each firm, treated trucks were randomly selected according to the assigned
share.
3. If a truck was on the threshold then it was randomly assigned to treatment or control
such that the expected value of treated trucks was equal to the randomly assigned
40For legal reasons, the owner’s approval is necessary to start the installation. Most of the time the owner
of the truck is the manager.
41The MoU detailed all the interviews the drivers and the managers would have to go through, as well
as the procedure of GPS installation. For the firm to participate in the study, the owner had to give his
approval for the interviews, and for the potential installation of GPS trackers. Drivers were individually
asked for consent to be interviewed.
42Firms are assigned a random number - the share of treated trucks - according to a normal distribution
centered in 2/3 and a standard deviation of 0.1. All firms assigned a number above 1 are assigned the number
1 and all firms assigned a number below 1/3 are assigned 1/3. This random assignment of shares of treated
trucks was initially done to investigate the extensive vs. intensive margin of treatment. However, results




At the end of this randomization, 104 trucks (68% of all trucks) where assigned to the
treatment group and 48 trucks where in the control group.
Despite the treatment being entirely free for the firms and extensive efforts from the
mechanics to install the devices, by March 2017 (7 months after the beginning of treatment)
only 55 of the 104 trackers had been installed (53% of the treatment group).
Given the slow take-up of treatment a second round of randomization was done in April
2017. The second randomization followed the procedure of the first randomization, and
assigned an additional one third of the control group to the treatment group. At the end of
the second randomization, 19 more trucks were assigned to the treatment, bringing the total
number of treatment trucks to 123 (81% of all trucks).
By the end of April, the number of trackers installed reached 80 out of the 123 assigned
to treatment (65%). Despite strong efforts to install GPS trackers, no trackers were installed
between May and September 2017.
Figure 1.2 shows the timeline of installation of the GPS trackers. The blue dashed line
shows the number of trackers assigned to treatment, while the plain red line shows the
number of trackers installed. While there appears to be some progression in the first months
after the assignment of trucks to treatment, after a year, the number of installations seems
to have reached a limit.
In the rest of the paper I will call treatment and control the groups after the second
randomization as follows: the “control group” is the group of trucks that were not selected
for treatment on either of the randomizations, and the “treatment group” is the group of
trucks that where selected on either the first or the second randomization. Table 3.1 shows
that treatment and control groups are balanced. The balance table for the first randomization
can be found in the Appendix.
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1.3.2.2 GPS trackers and installation
All the trucks in the treatment group were assigned a GPS tracker with a label stating the
license plate of the truck they were assigned to (or other form of truck identification) as well
as the name of the driver. To make sure that a truck in the control group did not wrongly
receive a GPS tracker, the mechanic was asked to verify the license plate of the truck and
the name of the driver before starting the installation.
GPS trackers used for the purpose of this study are small black boxes of around 3 inches
width by 2 inches length (figure 1.3 shows a picture of a tracker). To be properly functional,
GPS trackers must be installed inside the truck’s dashboard by a professional mechanic. The
GPS tracker is directly connected to the battery of the truck, which allows it to stay on even
when the engine is turned off. The tracker turns off soon after the battery of the truck is
disconnected from the truck (which is pretty common in Liberia when the truck is parked,
to avoid battery theft).43 The installation takes about 30 minutes to 2 hours, depending
on the truck. The mechanics were hired by the research team, and were sent to the truck’s
parking space, so that the tracker and the installation were completely free of charge for the
company. Figure 1.3 shows a mechanic working on the dashboard to install the tracker.
Once the GPS tracker is properly installed on the truck, it sends the position of the truck
through a mobile network to an online server. The combination of mobile networks used
covers most of the road network, ensuring that the position of the truck is precisely reported
over time. The server stores the history of recorded positions. Codes of access for the online
platform to access the data were given to the owner of the truck.44 A printed manual for
using the online platform was also provided to the owner, as well as the telephone numbers
that they could reach if they needed help. In the cases in which the owner was not the direct
43Other more complex trackers are able to give other type of information such as the oil level. The GPS
tracking devices used in this study do not; they only give information on the location of the truck.
44Driver were not given the codes to access the the online platform.
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manager of the driver, the owner shared access codes with the manager. The bottom picture
of figure 1.3 shows an example of a trip.
It quickly became apparent that the drivers were unhappy about the GPS tracking de-
vices. To ensure that the devices were installed on the trucks according manager’s willingness,
and not the driver’s, the mechanics were asked to follow this procedure:
1. Mechanics contacted the driver assigned to the truck, and scheduled a meeting for the
installation.
2. If the first step failed and the tracker could not be installed, the mechanics contacted
the manager and asked him to schedule the meeting with the driver.
3. If the two first steps failed, the mechanics repeated the two first steps the following
week.
The mechanics received a wage partly based on the number of devices installed. In addition,
an independent enumerator verified that the mechanic contacted the drivers and showed up
at meetings.45 When a tracker failed46, it was immediately replaced by a new tracker.
1.3.3 Data
Data collection was done both before and after the installation of the GPS trackers. Data
collection was completed electronically by a team of twelve enumerators (one supervisor, ten
interviewers, and one back-checker47).
Two types of interviews were completed: manager and driver interviews.
45While the mechanics sometimes failed to show up at meetings, significant effort was done to correct
these errors. By the end of the treatment period, all failures of installation where due to a failure from the
company’s side.
46Fewer than five trackers were reported to fail during the experiment.
47Interviewers complete interviews on the phone or in-person. The supervisor makes sure that the inter-
viewers are accurately completing interviews. The back-checker contacts a randomly chosen sample of 10
percent of interviewees and corroborates answers collected by interviewers.
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1.3.3.1 Manager interviews
Managers were first interviewed at baseline, upon recruitment of the firms. These rounds
of interviews lasted from the end of August to the end of October 2016. After the baseline,
follow-up interviews were completed regularly. Three rounds of follow-ups were completed:
January 2017, February 2017 and March 2017.
The baseline and follow-up interviews of managers were very similar. They included
questions on:
• The manager (the interviewee), including age, nationality and county of origin.
• The business, including registration status, number of employees, number of trucks
and sector.
• The transport sector, including the state of roads, estimated travel times, the compe-
tition and the difficulty of finding loads.
• The truck, including type, age and price when bought.
• Each driver. Managers were asked to rank on a scale from 0 to 10 a set of statements
such as their relationship to the driver or the care the driver takes of the trucks.
• The drivers’ trips. For each trip completed in the past month that they could remem-
ber48, the managers were asked questions about the origin and destination, estimated
time of completion, the types and length of breaks, the commodity transported, tech-
nical issues and whether there was another truck from the same company on the trip.
The baseline interviews were all conducted in person. Follow-up interviews were done in
person or on the phone at the convenience of the manager. The baseline interviews lasted up
48To limit the length of the interview, we limited the number of trips to three per driver. If the driver
completed more than three trips in the last month, the manager was asked about the three main trips
completed.
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to one hour and thirty minutes, and follow-up interviews lasted on average half an hour.49
1.3.3.2 Driver interviews
Drivers were interviewed at baseline, in the same period that the manager baseline was
completed. There was one follow-up interview for drivers, in April 2017.
Driver interviews were shorter than managers interviews and included questions on:
• The drivers (the interviewee), including their wage, their nationality and their county
of origin. Drivers were asked to rank on a scale from 0 to 10 a set of statements which
mimicked the managers’ interviews. Statements included their relationship with their
manager and the care they take of the trucks.
• Their trips. For each trip completed in the past month50, the drivers were asked the
same questions as the managers: origin and destination, estimated time of comple-
tion, the types and length of breaks, the commodity transported, technical issues and
whether the was another truck from the same company on the trip.51
In addition to the questionnaire, enumerators where trained to explain the role of the GPS
tracking device and the manager’s ability to track the truck at baseline.52 Driver interviews
were all carried out in person during the baseline and follow-up, except when an in-person
was not feasible. Interviews usually lasted between thirty and forty minutes.
49Since interviews were relatively long and frequent, we prevented manager’s exhaustion by interviewing
them at their own convenience. Also, the enumerators were assigned to companies so that the managers
knew the enumerators calling them.
50To limit the length of the interview, we limited the number of trips to three per driver. If the driver
completed more than three trips in the last month, the manager was asked about the three main trips
completed.
51Since driver interviews and the manager interviews are not overlapping in time (except for the baseline),
it is not possible to directly compare the data on trips from drivers and managers interviews.
52Not informing the drivers about the GPS tracking devices would have put drivers at risk of being
reprimanded or disciplined by their managers.
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Figure 1.4 shows the timeline of interviews.
1.3.3.3 Distance and speed
Given that the GPS trackers are only installed on the trucks of the treatment group, their
data cannot be used for measuring treatment effects.
For this reason, I use data collected from interviews to estimate speed of drivers, and the
length of breaks. For each trip, interviewees are asked about origin and destination, the time
it took them to complete, and an estimate of the time they spent on breaks. To calculate
speed, I additionally used a distance measure that is based on the distance between origin
and destination locations as calculated by Google Maps.53
Providing a precise estimation of the length of a trip or a break is not an easy exercise,
which led to a lot of measurement error. Observations with unrealistic speed estimates were
dropped.54 The reliability of the data from interviews and how it affects the results are
discussed in a greater length in the next section, which explains the effect of the treatment
on treated drivers.
1.4 Results of the Experiment
1.4.1 Econometric Specification
The key variation that I exploit is within drivers over time. I collected data before and after
the treatment event, which allows me to use a difference-in-difference regression framework
with driver fixed effects. To capture seasonal variation and infrastructure differences among
53Given Liberia’s road network, there is often only one route to go from one city to another. In case Google
Maps offered two itineraries, the most common route was confirmed by managers of trucking companies. In
those cases, the distance difference was not high and the results are unaltered using one route or the other.
54See Appendix for more details on the cleaning procedure.
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roads I also use month and road fixed effects. I estimate both the intent-to-treat estimate
and the local average treatment effect.
1.4.1.1 Specification at the trip level
The first specification I use is at the trip level. The main regression follows:
yitr = αi + βr + γt +Xitr + δTit + 
Where yitr is the output for driver i at time t on road r,
αi, βr, γt are driver, road, and time fixed effects,
Xitr are trip controls (the type of goods transported, technical issues during the trip, and
whether there were several trucks from the same company on the trip),
Tit is the treatment variable, which takes the value one when the truck of driver i was
assigned to treatment at t,
and δ is the coefficient of interest.
The results of these regressions yield the intent-to-treat estimates. To compute the
local average treatment effect on the treated, I instrument the treatment take-up with the
assignment to treatment.55
1.4.1.2 Specification at the driver level
One concern is that treatment affects the number of trips the driver completed, and biases
the number of observations in each group. To avoid that, in a second specification I reduce
the number of observations at the driver-period level (rather than at the trip level). I apply
a fixed effects method in a first stage, and use the fixed-effects of the first stage to run the
second stage.
55In all tables, two stage regressions are done using 2SLS.
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First stage:
yitr = λit + βr +Xitr + 
Where yitr is the output for driver i at time t on road r,
βr is a road fixed effect,
Xitr are trip controls (the type of goods transported, technical issues during the trip, and
whether there were several trucks from the same company on the trip),
and λit is a driver-period56 fixed effect
Second stage:
I recover the driver-period fixed effects from the first stage, and use it as the output for
the second stage. Now the observations are at the driver level.
λˆit = αi + γt + δTit + 
Where Tit is the treatment variable, which takes the value one when the truck of driver i
was assigned to treatment at t,
and αi and γt are driver and period fixed effects.
1.4.2 Effect of Monitoring on Driver Performance
A monitoring device should increase workers’ efficiency along measures of effort monitored
by the device. In this section, I study the effect of GPS tracking devices on speed and length
of breaks.
56Two periods are defined: before and after the randomization.
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1.4.2.1 Effect on Speed
The first output I explore is the average speed of drivers. By definition of the treatment
only the treated group has a GPS tracker, so that the average speed is estimated with
information from interviews (completion time, destination and origin). I compute separate
estimates based on drivers and managers interviews.
In this case, the output (yitr in the previous section) is the average speed (of driver i, on
road r, which happened at time t).
For clarity, all tables in this section present the specifications in the same order. Columns
(1), (2) and (3) show “Instrumental Variable” estimates, which is the local average treatment
effect on the treated. Columns (4), (5) and (6) show “Reduced Form” estimates, also called
intent-to-treat estimates, which is the effect of assignment to treatment. Columns (1) and
(4) have no fixed effects, columns (2) and (5) have period, driver and road fixed effects, and
columns (3) and (6) have the same fixed effects as (2) and (5), and additional trip controls
(fixed effect on types of goods transported, technical issues during the trip, and whether
another truck from the same company was on the trip).
Tables 1.3 and 1.4 show the effect of the treatment on speed of drivers, at the trip
level. Table 1.3 was computed using data from the manager interviews. It shows that the
installation of the GPS tracker significantly increase the average speed of the drivers, as
estimated by their managers. The local average treatment estimate indicate that, according
to managers, monitoring devices increased the speed of treated drivers by about 21 kilometers
per hour. Due to the low take-up of the treatment - which is explored in the next section -
the intent-to-treat estimates are smaller. Being assigned to treatment increased the average
speed of the driver by 9.6 kilometers per hour.
To ensure that these results do not come from bias in the managers’ interviews, I compute
estimates based on drivers interviews. Managers might be biased if in order to keep good
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relationships with the research team57, they over-estimate the effect of the tracker58. If this
is the case, estimates from table 1.3 may be an over-estimation of the effect. Table 1.4 shows
the same specification, but in this case speed was estimated from the drivers interviews.
While drivers can also be biased in answering the interviews, they on the contrary would
want to under-estimate the effect of the tracker.59 In this case, estimates from table 1.4 would
be an under-estimation. Estimates from table 1.4 show that the effect of the treatment on
speed is very similar than the ones from table 1.3. The local average treatment estimate
indicated that, according to drivers, monitoring devices increased the speed of drivers by
about 18 kilometers per hour, while the intent-to-treat estimate is 10 kilometers per hour.
The specification at the driver level (described in section 4.1.2) gives very similar es-
timates, presented in tables 1.5 and 1.6. The preferred specification is the estimation of
the effect of treatment at the driver level, using driver interviews. This estimation shows
that the treatment increased the speed of treated drivers by 14 kilometers per hour. This is
the specification that will be used in the remainder of the paper. Other specifications are
available in the Appendix.
1.4.2.2 Effect on Breaks
The installation of monitoring seems to significantly increase the speed of treated drivers,
however if drivers go faster on the road, this may have unexpected consequences (such as
more accidents on the road).
In this section, I explore the effect of the treatment on the length of the breaks taken by
57Given the positive and significant effect of the trackers on the drivers’ efficiency, it would not be surprising
for the companies to want trackers on their trucks in the control group as well.
58Note that nor the managers nor the drivers were told what the purpose of the research, but the managers
could have guessed that the speed was one of the outputs of interest.
59Given that, as seen in section 6, drivers on average prefer not to be monitored, they would want to
convince the research team that monitoring drivers have no effect on their performance.
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the driver during a trip. I measure the length of breaks from interviews both in hours and
as a percentage of the total trip. Here, breaks include all sorts of reasons to stop, such as
deliveries, stops because of mud on the road, or personal breaks.
yits is the length of breaks of the total time of the trip, for driver i, on trip t, which
happened at time s.
Tables 1.7 and 1.8 show the effect of the treatment on the length of breaks. Table
1.7 shows the estimate of the effect of monitoring on breaks in hours, and table 1.8 shows
estimates on breaks as a percentage of the total trip. Both tables show that GPS trackers
significantly reduced the length of breaks during a trip. Estimates show that drivers with
GPS trackers spend around 25% of their trip less on breaks.
These results suggest that the GPS trackers increase speed by decreasing the number of
breaks the driver takes.
1.4.2.3 Effect on accidents, maintenance costs and technical problems
To further show that the increase in speed did not have a detrimental effect, table 1.9 presents
estimates of the treatment effect on the number of accidents, maintenance costs and technical
problems. The coefficients are very small and not significant.
Estimates reveal that the tracking devices significantly increases monitored drivers’ aver-
age speeds, without leading to higher accident rates or maintenance costs. In the following
sections, I explore why managers refused to install monitoring devices on selected trucks.
1.5 Model and Predictions
Despite the fact that GPS trackers were offered at zero cost, and clear evidence of benefit
on monitored drivers, the take-up rate of monitoring devices remains low even a year after
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the start of the experiment. Managers deliberately declined to install the devices on 35
percent of the trucks selected for treatment. In this section I describe a mechanism based
on Bénabou and Tirole (2006) that can account for the incomplete take-up rate. The model
has two predictions which will be tested empirically in the following section.
1.5.1 Model
The agent takes action a, which sends a signal s = a+  (with  ∼ N (0, σ)) to the principal.
The key element of the model is that when taking action a, the agent has an intrinsic
motivation for taking that action, and he values the principal’s opinion of that intrinsic
motivation.
The principal rewards the agent for his action and also chooses whether he wants to
monitor the agent or not. Monitoring allows the principal to reduce the variance of the
signal s so that better monitoring allows him to better provide incentives to the agent. This
means that a tighter monitoring, m, gives more incentives to the agent.60 The agent values
these extrinsic incentives based on the signal s with vm (vm > 0). The agent also has an
intrinsic motivation for contributing to the task, va (va > 0).














The action a has a cost for the agent, C(a) = 1
2
ka2. The agent’s direct benefit can be written:
B = w + vaa+ vmm · s− C(a)
60If the principal can better measure the output of the driver, he (i) can provide “better” bonuses – bonuses
that better reflect the agent’s effort – and (ii) has a higher probability of catching shirking behavior. In both
cases, the agent has higher incentives to provide effort.
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Additionally, the agent values the principal’s opinion of his intrinsic motivation. We
suppose that that valuation depends linearly on the principal’s posterior observation:
µE[va|s,m]
Where µ is known to both the agent and the principal. This parameter is key in this
model. It represents how much the agent cares about the principal’s opinion. For example,
the agent will value the principal’s opinion if she cares about her reputation (for future
employment or recommendations), or if the principal can retaliate through their common
network (in the case where they do have a common network). Note that µ is a value of
the principal-agent pair. How the agent cares about the principal’s opinion depends on
the identity of the principal. This parameter represents an informal contract between the
principal and agent, and we suppose that the value of µ is common knowledge.
An agent with preferences v ≡ (va, vm) and “image concerns” µ has the utility:
U = w + vaa+ vmm · s− C(a) + µE[va|s,m]
There is uncertainty about the signal, s, and we suppose for simplicity that the agent is
risk-neutral so that he maximizes his expected utility:
max
a
Es[U |a] = w + vaa+ vmm · a− C(a) + µEs [E[va|s,m]|a]
Which yields:
k · a− ∂R(a,m)
∂a
= va + vm ·m (1.1)
Where R(a,m) = µEs [E[va|s,m]|a]

















































Note that, by definition
1
µ
R(a,m) = Es [E[va|s,m]|a]









And from equation 1.1:
a =








So on average over the population, the optimal level of effort chosen by an agent with
image concerns µ is:
a¯ =










Equation 1.3 has two terms. The first term, v¯a+v¯m·m
k
is the result of explicit incentives:





, represents the adverse effect of monitoring and is decreasing in monitoring.
The intuition for this last term is that tighter monitoring undermines the agent’s ability
to signal his intrinsic motivation. If the second term’s negative effect over-compensates the
first term’s additional incentives, the effect of monitoring might be detrimental to the level
of effort provided by the agent.
The model presented here is similar to the model of Bénabou and Tirole (2006), with
two differences. First, while the agent does want to appear “prosocial” (µ > 0), she does not
care about looking “greedy” (she does not care about the expected value of vm). The reason
this assumption was dropped is that I don’t need it to explain the phenomena observed
in this study. However, adding it to the model would not change the conclusions or the
interpretations. Second, the principal here does not observe directly the effort of the agent.
This assumption had to be added since the principal here is deciding to monitor or not,
which would not be a option if he observed the agent’s effort.
When determining if he should monitor or not the agent, the principal has to determine
if the agent’s optimal effort is increasing or decreasing in monitoring. The parameter µ
(known to both the agent and the principal) is key in this setting. The interpretation and
predictions of the model are presented in the next section.
1.5.2 Predictions
Figure 1.5 shows how, according to the model, the population-average optimal level of effort
(a¯) varies with the level of monitoring for agents with different levels of µ. Given that µ
represents how the agent values the principal’s opinion of her intrinsic motivation, µ will
be referred to as “image concerns”. The figure shows that while for low levels of image
concerns (low µ), effort is an increasing function of monitoring, for some high levels of image
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concerns, the optimal level of effort is decreasing and then increasing in monitoring m. The
figure illustrates two main predictions.
First,for low ranges of monitoring, monitoring increases effort for agents with low image
concerns and is counter-productive for agents with high image concerns. In figure 1.5, two
levels of monitoring are presented, m = 0.5 andm = 1.5. For agents with low image concerns
(µ = 0 or µ = 1), transitioning from m = 0.5 to m = 1.5 increases the optimal level of effort.
Conversely, for agents with high image concerns (µ = 3 or µ = 4), transitioning fromm = 0.5
to m = 1.5 decreases the optimal level of effort. If, in choosing whether to increase the level
of monitoring from m = 0.5 to m = 1.5, the manager observes µ, he will monitor agents
with low image concerns.
Second, the effect of monitoring is greater the lower are image concerns (the lower µ).
In figure 1.5, transitioning from m = 0.5 to m = 1.5 increases the optimal level of effort
for both agents with µ = 0 and µ = 1. However the impact of monitoring (the difference
between the optimal level effort at m = 0.5 and the new optimal level at m = 1.5) is greater
for the agent with µ = 0.
These two predictions depend on image concerns. In order to test them, I need a measure
of image concerns. In figure 1.5, it is clear that for any given level of monitoring, higher
image concerns predict a higher level of effort. Therefore, a proxy for image concerns is the
baseline level of effort. Other characteristics of the manager-driver pair may also predict
higher image concerns, such as a matching county of origin: if the drivers come from the
manager’s county, he is more likely to care about his reputation and will have higher image
concerns.
The two predictions of the model become:
1. The effect of monitoring is positive for agents who show low effort at baseline and
monitoring is counter-productive for agents that showed high effort at baseline.
2. The effect of monitoring is decreasing in baseline effort and becomes negative for drivers
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who show high effort at baseline.
The next section tests these predictions.
1.6 Empirical Evidence
1.6.1 Baseline characteristics on treatment take-up
Managers decide which drivers will and will not receive a GPS tracker. According to the
model, they base their decision on their priors about the driver. In this section, I show that
the managers decided to install GPS trackers on the trucks of drivers that showed lower
levels of effort at baseline, indicating lower image concerns.
Figure 1.6 shows how drivers in the treatment group compare at baseline according to
treatment take-up. On every panel, the top line presents the average and the 95% confidence
interval for drivers for whom the manager refused to install a GPS tracking device. The
bottom line presents the same information but for drivers who received a tracker. The figure
is based on interviews from managers.
The figure clearly shows that managers chose to install GPS tracking devices on drivers
who showed lower performance at baseline. At baseline, according to managers, drivers who
received the tracker were slower, were less able to follow the rules of the firm (such as not
transporting unauthorized passengers or goods, or not using the truck for personal reasons),
and were more likely to have accidents. During interviews, managers are asked to rate their
relationship with their drivers on a scale from 0 to 10. Managers decided to install monitoring
devices on drivers who received a lower “relationship index”. Managers are also more likely
to install a monitoring device on drivers from a different county of origin.
This evidence confirms the hypothesis that managers are more likely to install monitoring
devices on drivers with whom they don’t have “informal arrangements”. In particular, the
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last piece of evidence (the fact that manager are less likely to monitor someone from their
county of origin) is consistent with the interpretation of image concerns: drivers from the
same county of origin than their managers are more likely to have high reputation concerns.
Figure 1.6, together with the results from section 4, show that the manager selected the
driver who performed less well at baseline, and that on those drivers, the effect of monitoring
was positive. I now explore the heterogeneity of the treatment effect.
1.6.2 Treatment heterogeneity on speed
In this section I examine the heterogeneity of the treatment on speed.
I use the specification at the trip level presented in section 4, with an interaction-term:
λˆit = αi + γt + piTit + δTit × basei + 
where all the variables are defined as in section 4 and basei is a baseline proxy of effort. The
coefficient of interest is δ, it indicates whether the baseline proxy of effort is positively or
negatively correlated with the effect of treatment.
The baseline proxies for effort include the average time spent on breaks (as a percentage
of total trip), the propensity of the driver to follow the rules of the business, the relation
between the driver and the manager (as rated from 0 to 10), and whether they are from the
same ethnicity.
Table 1.10 presents the results. Columns (1) to (5) explore the heterogeneity of the effect
of treatment with respect to baseline proxies of effort. Drivers who completed trips faster
at baseline, who respected the rules of the business, and who took good care of their truck,
showed a higher effect of the treatment. This effect also appears for drivers who were given
a high “relationship index” by their manager, and who have the same county of origin.
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I combine the different baseline characteristics of drivers into a “propensity to be treated”
index. This index is the fitted value of a logit regression of the variable “received treatment”
on baseline characteristics, such as baseline proxies for effort, “relationship index”, or match-
ing origins.61 The index takes values from 0 to 1 and increases with the probability of being
treated. Figure 1.7 shows the histogram of treated and not treated drivers with respected to
the “propensity to be treated” index. As expected, treated drivers are especially numerous
in high levels of the index, while drivers who were not treated tend to be in lower levels of
the index. Following the predictions of the model, a high propensity to be treated reflects a
driver with low image concerns.
Column (5) of table 1.10 shows the heterogeneity effect of treatment with respect to a
“propensity to be treated” index. The effect is consistent with the previous columns: a
higher propensity to be treated at baseline increases the effect of treatment.
1.6.3 Treatment heterogeneity on other outputs
Using the same specification than in the previous section, I explore the heterogeneity of the
effect with respect to the “propensity to be treated” index.
Table 1.11 presents the results. I explore two different measures of effort. First, I explore
the propensity of the driver to follow the rules of the business. Managers were asked to rank
on a scale from 0 to 10, whether they believed the driver followed the rules of the business
(Fully Disagree - 0 to Fully Agree -10). The results from this measure are presented in
column (1). While treatment seems to have a positive effect on the propensity of the driver
to follow the rules of the business for drivers with a high propensity to be treated, this effect
disappears for drivers with a low propensity to be treated.
Second, I explore the propensity of the driver to take care of the trucks. Managers were
also asked to rank on the same scale whether they believed the driver took good care of the
61This regression is available in the appendix.
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truck. The results from this measure of effort are very similar, and are presented in column
(2).
To explore whether the treatment was counter-productive for some drivers, I divide
drivers in three groups according to their tercile in the “propensity to be treated” index.
Figure 1.8 shows the treatment coefficients for each group. Clearly, the coefficient for the
first tercile (the group with the lowest propensity to be treated) is negative: according to
managers, treatment had a negative impact on the propensity of this group to follow the
rules of the business and to take care of the trucks. This confirms the hypothesis that mon-
itoring is counter-productive for drivers who provided a high level of effort at baseline. This
also confirms the findings of Belot and Schröder (2016) who show that monitoring increases
cheating on dimensions that are not monitored. Here I find that it lowers the level of effort on
these other dimensions, but only for one group of drivers (drivers who have a low propensity
to be treated).
1.6.4 Robustness Checks
1.6.4.1 Effect of monitoring on relationships
According to the mechanism explored in this paper, if an employer decides to monitor the
worker with whom he had a prior informal arrangement, their relationship deteriorates.
During interviews, managers are asked to rank between 0 and 10 their relationship with
their drivers. While on average the treatment did not seem to have any effect on this
“relationship index”, the impact is very heterogenous. Table 1.12 shows the heterogeneity
of the effect with respect to the “propensity to be treated” index. For drivers with a high
propensity to be treated index have a positive impact of monitoring on their relationship
with their manager, the impact is negative for drivers with a low index. Separating the
sample into three terciles of this index shows that the effect is in fact negative for drivers
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with a low score. Figure 1.9 shows the graph of the coefficients for these different groups.
Managers are also asked to rank between 0 and 10 their trust in each of their drivers.
Results for this “trust index” are similar than for the relationship index, confirming that the
decision to monitor is a signal of distrust to the drivers.
1.6.4.2 Treatment heterogeneity according to drivers
All the results presented until now (except results on speed and breaks) were based on
manager interviews. In this section I will present results based on driver interviews.
During each interview, drivers are asked to rank some statements on a scale from 0
(Disagree) to 10 (Agree). I explore the effect of treatment on three different statements: “I
like working for this firm”, “I like being a driver”, “I am a good driver”. Drivers are also
asked to rank their relationship with their manager on a scale from 0 to 10.
The heterogeneity of each of this measures with respect to the propensity to be treated
index is presented in table 1.13 and figure 1.10. Results are consistent with manager inter-
views: drivers with a low propensity to be treated are negatively affected by the treatment.
They are less likely to like their firm, less likely to enjoy their work, and less likely to be
good drivers. The impact on their relationship with their manager goes in the same directing,
though less significantly. 62
1.6.4.3 An estimate of the benefits from monitoring
If the benefits from installing GPS trackers were small, a small but positive cost of installation
would explain why managers chose not to install GPS tracking devices on some trucks.63 In
62Note that the number of observations from drivers’ interviews is much smaller, since they only had one
follow-up, while managers had three.
63Given that in this experiment, GPS trackers are given at zero cost (including the mechanic’s pay), the
“cost of installation” entirely comes from the opportunity cost of the driver and the truck not transporting
goods during the installation.
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this section, I present a back-of-the-envelope estimate of the benefits from installing the
monitoring device on monitored drivers.
When managers were explained what a GPS tracking device is, they pointed out three
main reasons why it could be beneficial to their firm. First, the devices would allow managers
to better monitor drivers. Second, the devices would allow managers to estimate the time
of arrival at the destination, as well as the time of return to the base, which would allow
them to better allocate goods to trucks. Finally, in case the vehicle is stolen, the company
would be able to locate the truck and possibly recover it.64 In this project, when calculating
the benefits of the GPS tracking devices, I focus only on the first effect, the monitoring of
the driver. Benefits from this effect are directly measurable, as opposed to the two other
effects. These two other effects also contribute to the overall effect of the monitoring device
on transport costs, so in that regard, my estimates of the benefits of monitoring devices
under-estimate the overall effect.
Table 2.5 shows estimates of trucks’ marginal cost per kilometer. For reference, the same
estimates are shown for the United States. The cost per kilometer is more than 2.6 times
higher in Liberia than it is in the United States.65
As shown in section 4, monitoring devices significantly increase the speed of drivers, by
58 percent. Most of the costs per kilometer will not be affected by the number of trips
completed by the truck. However, the price of the truck as well as the permits and licenses
are fixed costs, and their impact will lower if the number of kilometers completed by the
firm changes.
The last line of table 2.5 shows that the number of kilometers completed by a truck
in the United States is almost 20 times higher than the number of kilometers completed
64While this seemed to be a concern for managers at baseline, none of the trucks in my sample were stolen
during the experiment.
65This coefficient is comparable to what Atkin and Donaldson (2015) find for Nigeria (2.2 times higher
than the United States) and Ethiopia (3.3 times higher).
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by trucks in Liberia. If the speed of the truck significantly increases, the trucks in Liberia
will be able to complete more trips and increase the number of kilometers they travel in a
year. If the number of trips directly adapts to the increased speed of drivers, the overall
number of kilometers will increase by a factor 1.58, which will bring the overall number of
kilometers completed to 9,070.66 The price of the truck and the price of permits and licenses
per kilometer will decrease, by the same factor. Assuming that the prices of fuel, repairs,
bribes, wages and benefits remain constant per km, the overall marginal cost will come down
to USD 2.16 per kilometer. Given that on average a truck covers 5,742 kilometers per year,
in one year a monitoring device would save USD 976.
If the benefits of monitoring drivers was constant across drivers, the cost of installation
for the drivers that did not receive a tracking device despite being in the treatment group,
should be higher than one thousand dollars, or 162 driver days.67 This seems unlikely, and
confirms the hypothesis that the benefits of monitoring are not constant across drivers.
1.7 Conclusion
The experiment demonstrates that the introduction of GPS monitoring to Liberian trucking
firms results in significantly increased route completion speeds for monitored drivers. How-
ever, the effect of monitoring varies from driver to driver. These effects can be explained
by segmenting the drivers into certain heterogeneous groups. Specifically, drivers who do
not value the manager’s opinion about them have high productivity returns on monitoring
treatment. On the other hand, drivers who value the manager’s opinion have low returns on
treatment, with some cases exhibiting counter-productive effects on individual productivity.
I show that these effects are consistent with the theory of motivation crowding.
66This is assuming that the trucking companies are facing unlimited demand.
67Drivers are paid on average USD 6 per day.
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This study indicates that productivity gains from technology adoption can be challenged
by the presence of informal arrangements between principals and agents. This effect is
especially pronounced in developing countries, where parties extensively rely on informal
arrangements. However, this study should not be interpreted as evidence that the intro-
duction of technology is counter-productive across-the-board. The conclusion to be drawn
here is that blind application of monitoring technology may produce a sub-optimal effect on
overall productivity. To maximize productivity gain, the choice of which drivers to monitor
should take into consideration the motivations of each individual driver. In the long term,
this experiment indicates that GPS tracking devices could allow firms to hire drivers outside
of their network without a corresponding loss of productivity.
In addition, this study contributes to the explanation of high transport costs in developing
countries by demonstrating that there is a substantial cost due to information asymmetry
between managers and drivers. Resolving this information asymmetry (via GPS monitoring)




Figure 1.2: Timeline of GPS tracker installation
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Figure 1.3: GPS Tracker and Truck Dashboard
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Figure 1.4: Timeline of Interviews
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Figure 1.5: Optimal Effort Level as a Function of monitoring
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Figure 1.6: Baseline Comparison of Speed by Treatment Take-Up
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Figure 1.7: Propensity to be Treated
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Figure 1.8: Effect of Treatment by Quartiles of “Propensity to be Treated” Index
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Figure 1.9: Effect of Treatment by Quartiles of “Propensity to be Treated” Index
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Figure 1.10: Effect of Treatment by Quartiles of “Propensity to be Treated” Index
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Table 1.1: Summary Statistics at Baseline
Mean Std. Dev. Min Max Count
Managers
How many trucks does the firm own? 3.98 5.92 1.00 33.00 62
Is transport the main activity? 0.76 0.43 0.00 1.00 62
Is the firm officially registered? 0.71 0.46 0.00 1.00 62
What is the total number of employees? 16.18 31.87 1.00 188.00 62
Does the firm deliver goods outside the country? 0.21 0.41 0.00 1.00 62
Gender of the interviewee (Male=0; Female=1) 0.02 0.13 0.00 1.00 62
Is the manager Liberian? 0.92 0.27 0.00 1.00 62
Is the manager a driver? 0.44 0.50 0.00 1.00 62
Does your business hire carboys? 0.56 0.50 0.00 1.00 62
How many tires did your business purchased last month? 4.15 4.30 0.00 20.00 62
Did the firm ever pay for overloading? 0.27 0.45 0.00 1.00 62
Has this firm ever been a victim of theft? 0.35 0.48 0.00 1.00 62
Is the firm based in Monrovia? 0.69 0.46 0.00 1.00 62
Drivers always assigned to same truck 0.98 0.23 0.00 2.00 55
Trucks
Did the firm import this truck? (No=0; Yes=1) 0.65 0.48 0.00 1.00 152
Truck was second-hand when bought 0.86 0.35 0.00 1.00 152
Maintenance in the past month (USD): 609.09 1112.07 0.00 11000.00 152
Price of truck when bought (1k USD) 23.81 21.31 2.30 120.00 91
Drivers
Did you ever had an accident? 0.42 0.49 0.00 1.00 142
Driver wage (in USD per day): 6.18 2.20 1.05 13.33 138
Trips
Distance of trip (km) 275.04 209.96 4.00 753.00 177
Time spent on trips (hours) 26.40 28.80 0.50 144.00 177
Average speed (km/h) - Rainy Season 18.13 12.01 5.05 44.36 177
Time of trip spent on breaks (hours) 9.68 22.86 0.00 144.75 156
Percentage of trip spent on breaks (%) 12.99 15.23 0.00 60.00 143
This table was computed with data collected during baseline interviews. Statistcs on managers and trucks
were computed using data from manager interviews, and summary statistics on drivers and trips were com-
puted using data from driver interviews. Baseline interviews were collected between August and October
2016, which corresponds to the rainy season. In the case where several managers were interviewed in the same
firm, the answers from the oldest manager were retained.
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Table 1.2: Balance Table
Diff(T-C) Std. Err. T-Stat P-Val
Managers
How many trucks does the firm own? -3.42 2.27 -1.50 0.13
Is transport the main activity? 0.09 0.08 1.16 0.25
Is the firm officily registered? 0.02 0.08 0.33 0.75
Does the firm deliver goods outside the country? -0.12 0.10 -1.19 0.24
Gender of the interviewee (Male=0; Female=1) -0.01 0.02 -0.48 0.63
Is the manager Liberian? 0.04 0.04 1.10 0.27
Is the manager a driver? 0.05 0.08 0.66 0.51
Does your business hire carboys? 0.12 0.10 1.13 0.26
How many tires did your business purchased last month? 0.20 1.09 0.18 0.86
Did the firm ever pay for overloading? 0.03 0.09 0.27 0.78
Has this firm ever been a victim of theft? -0.02 0.10 -0.17 0.87
Is the firm based in Monrovia? 0.08 0.08 0.98 0.33
Drivers always assigned to same truck -0.04 0.04 -0.90 0.37
Trucks
Truck was second-hand when bought 0.02 0.07 0.22 0.82
Maintenance in the past month (USD): 76.59 230.22 0.33 0.74
Price of truck when bought (1k USD) -4.44 5.40 -0.82 0.41
Drivers
Did you ever had an accident? -0.10 0.11 -0.87 0.39
Driver wage (in USD per day): -0.53 0.48 -1.10 0.28
Trips
Distance of trip (km) -13.37 26.82 -0.50 0.62
Time spent on trips (hours) -6.93 5.45 -1.27 0.21
Average speed (km/h) 2.04 2.30 0.89 0.38
Time of trip spent on breaks (hours) 3.95 4.53 0.87 0.38
Percentage of trip spent on breaks (%) 2.53 3.32 0.76 0.45
This table was computed with data collected during baseline interviews. Statistcs on managers and
trucks were computed using data from manager interviews, and summary statistics on drivers and trips
were computed using data from driver interviews. Baseline interviews were collected between August
and October 2016, which corresponds to the rainy season. In the case where several managers were
interviewed in the same firm, the answers from the oldest manager were retained.
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Table 1.3: Effect of Monitoring on Speed using Managers Interviews
Instrumental Variable Reduced Form













Treatment 15.71*** 20.24*** 21.04***
(5.765) (5.202) (5.357)
Assignment to Treatment 6.167** 8.923** 9.646**
(2.359) (4.340) (4.631)
Round FE X X X X
Driver FE X X X X
Road FE X X X X
Trip Controls X X
Observations 243 243 243 243 243 243
Standard errors are in parentheses and are clustered at the company-round level.
* p<.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01
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Table 1.4: Effect of Monitoring on Speed using Drivers Interviews
Instrumental Variable Reduced Form













Treatment 21.58*** 18.31*** 17.94***
(3.853) (6.315) (6.300)
Assignment to Treatment 12.30*** 10.41** 10.17**
(2.531) (4.011) (3.995)
Round FE X X X X
Driver FE X X X X
Road FE X X X X
Trip Controls X X
Observations 349 349 349 349 349 349
Standard errors are in parentheses and are clustered at the company-round level.
















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Table 1.11: Heterogeneous Effect of Monitoring on Other Measures of Effort
Manager Interviews
(1) (2)




Assignment to Treatment -3.890*** -1.929***
(0.850) (0.697)
Assignment to *
Propensity to be Treated 6.670*** 3.043***
(1.431) (1.063)
Round FE X X
Driver FE X X
Observations 622 622
Standard errors are in parentheses and are clustered at the company-round level.
* p<.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01
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Assignment to Treatment -2.898*** -2.065***
(0.738) (0.695)
Assignment to *
Propensity to be Treated 4.853*** 3.468***
(1.326) (1.153)
Round FE X X
Driver FE X X
Observations 622 622
Standard errors are in parentheses and are clustered at the company-round level.



















































































































































































































































































Table 1.14: Comparison of Marginal Costs of Freight Transport Companies
Marginal Cost
US Liberia
$ per km % $ per km %
Fuel Costs 0.25 25 0.84 32
Truck purchase or lease 0.143 14 0.449 17
Truck Repair/Maintenance 0.097 10 0.345 13
Truck Insurance Premiums 0.057 6 N/A 0
Permits and Licenses 0.012 1 0.074 3
Tires 0.027 3 0.072 3
Tolls 0.012 1 N/A 0
Bribes N/A 0 0.043 2
Driver Wages 0.31 31 0.68 26
Driver Benefits 0.081 8 0.1 4
TOTAL 0.989 100 2.603 100
km completed by a truck in a year 98,543 5,742
Data for the United States comes from the American Transportation Research Institute Survey of
2016. Data for Liberia comes from interviews of managers of trucking companies.
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Chapter 2





In West Africa, land transport prices are among the highest in the world (Teravaninthorn
and Raballand, 2009). These high transport prices make it expensive to ship goods within a
country, which isolates remote markets: consumers face high prices of imported commodities
and producers face low demand for their products. While a lot of work has been done to
measure and understand international trade costs (see literature surveyed in Anderson and
Wincoop, 2004), fewer is known about the access to rural areas within a country. However,
measuring and understanding intra-national trade costs is key to promote the integration of
remote regions.
In this paper, I propose an estimation of intra-national trade costs in Liberia. Using
data on Liberia’s commodity prices, I apply a method developed in Atkin and Donaldson
2015 to infer how trade costs vary with distance. I find that these estimates are significantly
bigger for Liberia than for other countries such as the United States. I then shed some light
on why this might be. Using data from a survey of transport companies, I include in the
estimation the average speed of vehicles on the road. This allows me to estimate how trade
costs vary with travel time. I conclude that the speed of vehicles, which captures road-
specific characteristics such as road quality, can explain a significant share of the difference
in trade costs between Liberia and the United States.
Estimating trade costs is particularly challenging when little data is available. In this
paper I apply the method developed in Atkin and Donaldson 2015 to Liberian data on
commodity prices. The method proposed in Atkin and Donaldson 2015 is based on a method
commonly used in the literature: the approximation of trade costs with price gaps between
pairs of markets. Atkin and Donaldson 2015 show that restricting price gaps between pairs
of markets that are actually trading and assuming a set of structural assumptions about
the market significantly improves the estimation. This method allows me to measure how
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trade costs vary with a specific cost-shifter, distance, while allowing some flexibility on the
structure of the market.
I verify that the three main results of the estimation in Atkin and Donaldson 2015 hold
for the case of Liberia. First, I show that restricting price gaps between market pairs that are
actually trading (rather than price gaps between all pairs of markets) doubles the estimate
of the effect of distance on trade costs. Second, I use the structural assumptions about the
market to measure pass-through on every road sections, and I show that estimated pass-
through is decreasing in distance. This result, which Atkin and Donaldson 2015 also find for
other countries, means that markets that are further away have a lower pass-through. Third,
I show that adjusting for this pass-through in the estimation of trade costs doubles again
the effect of distance on trade costs. These results are consistent with the results in Atkin
and Donaldson 2015, and confirm that their method yields similar results across countries.
In addition to these three key results, I show that the popular method of using price gaps
to estimate trade costs is indeed a good approximation. Using data on prices charged by
transport companies to transport goods within Liberia, I show that the effect of distance on
trade costs as estimated by price gaps is similar to the effect of distance on prices charged.
This results supports this paper as well as previous literature in using price gaps to estimate
trade costs.
Assuming that trade costs are a direct function of distance, these estimations allow me
to compare trade costs across countries. I conclude that estimates of trade costs in Liberia
are much bigger than in other countries. Estimates of trade costs in Liberia are for instance
more than ten times bigger than in the United States. These results are consistent with
transport surveys in both countries (Teravaninthorn and Raballand, 2009).
In the remaining of the paper, I shed light on why transport costs are so high in Liberia.
Using data from a survey of transport companies, I introduce a measure of road quality: the
speed of vehicles on each road. Instead of measuring the effect of distance on trade costs,
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the introduction of speed allows me to measure the effect of travel time on trade costs. In
doing so, I show that Liberia’s estimates of trade costs per travel time are less than four
times bigger than the United States. This means that the speed of vehicles, which in part
captures road quality, explains up to two thirds of the differences in trade costs between
Liberia and the United States.
Finally, I show that this result is consistent with a comparison of marginal costs reported
by trucking companies between Liberia and the United States. This comparison allows me
to further understand transport costs differences between the two countries. I find that the
average speed of trucks in Liberia results in a much smaller number of kilometers completed
per year compared to the United States. This, combined with a high price of fuel, of trucks
and of maintenance costs explains the difference in transport costs between the two countries.
A lot of the literature has focused on the estimation of trade costs. Anderson and
Wincoop (2004) present a survey of the methods to estimate trade costs. Only recently
has the literature tried to estimate trade costs within countries, and particularly developing
countries. Atkin and Donaldson (2015) suggest a method to measure intra-national trade
costs using commodity prices. This method has opened a new door to estimating and
understanding trade costs in the developing world. In particular, it was applied by Porteous
(2015) who finds that trade costs in Subsaharan Africa are much bigger than elsewhere, and
that lowering these trade costs to international standards would significantly reduce the price
of agricultural goods. In this paper I use the same method and I complement it with data
from surveys of transport companies, which allows me to show that travel time is a more
accurate cost-shifter than distance.
By looking at the effect of travel time on trade costs, this paper also relates to the role
of infrastructure on trade costs and economic integration. Among others, Donaldson (2018)
looks at the effect of railroads on trade costs and price gaps and Asher and Novosad (2016)
look at the effect of road construction on occupation. Storeygard (2016)uses distance as well
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as road quality (as measured by the surface of roads) to estimate transport costs determine
income. That I know of, this is the first paper that takes travel time as a proxy for road
quality and estimates the effect of travel time on transport costs.
In trying to understand why trade costs in some areas are higher than in other contexts,
a lot of authors point to the role of intermediaries or traders. Bergquist (2016) suggests
that intermediaries have a big market power. Moser et al. (2009) look at rice markets in
Madagascar and show that low market integration is due to low competition among traders
(due to high crime rates, remoteness and lack of information). Fafchamps and Gabre-Madhin
(2006) show that traders face high searching costs and Startz (2016) shows that in addition
to high searching costs, traders face contracting problems in Nigeria. In this paper I show
that indeed the role of intermediaries is key to explain high transport costs. However, I
do not focus on competition but on the marginal costs faced by these companies, and in
particular, on the average speed of vehicles on the road.
A lot has yet to be done in the literature in terms of collecting transport costs across
countries. This paper is also innovative in that, apart for this paper, one of the only studies
that collected transport prices is Teravaninthorn and Raballand, 2009.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 introduces the different datasets
used for the estimation of trade costs. Section 3 presents the theoretical framework of the
estimation. Section 4 describes the results of the estimation. Section 5 presents robustness
checks based on the transport survey, which confirm previous results. Section 6 concludes.
2.2 Data
Two different sources of data were combined for this study. First, price data comes from a
detailed micro-level price dataset collected by the government in different markets of Liberia.
The second dataset which includes trading market pairs, travel times, and transport prices
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was collected through a survey of transport companies. In this section, I describe the different
datasets used in this paper.
2.2.1 Commodity Prices
The price data used in this paper was collected by the statistical agency of the government
of Liberia, Lisgis. The data was collected in order to compare prices of basic commodities
or commonly produced goods in different markets across the country. In each market, Lisgis
hired local enumerators to collect prices of commodities every two weeks from three different
vendors. By month, if the six prices collected are different, outliers are dropped and the
mean of the prices is reported. Only monthly aggregated data will be used in this study.
Data collection started in 2009 in ten different markets for 9 commodities. By 2016, data
collection expanded to 22 different markets for 13 different commodities. Prices are reported
for the following commodities: cowpeas, bitter balls, paddy rice, imported rice, cane juice
(two types), cassava, charcoal, pepper, gasoline, palm-oil, cocoa, and rubber. Prices were
collected in Liberia’s 22 main markets, spread out around the country, with at least one
market present in the database per county. In this study prices will be used at the cit level.
The only city with two markets is Monrovia, the capital, and the price used is the average
price between the two markets. The prices used in this paper have been collected between
January 2009 and August 2016. Note that data collection did not stop during the Ebola
crisis (mid-2014 to mid-2015), but the availability of products dropped so that the number
of reported prices decreased during the period.
One common challenge with using commodity prices is that spatial price gaps may reflect
differences in unobserved product characteristics, such as quality. Here however, because the
goal of the data collection was to compare the price of goods across markets, commodities
have been chosen so that they are relatively homogenous. When possible and available,
the prices refer to a particular brand sold in a particular quantity (for example, the price
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of imported rice refers to 50kg bags of Bella Luna rice). In addition, there is little to no
negotiation over the price for the goods selected.
Prices were cleaned using the same method than in the literature. Outliers were dropped
manually. Prices were corrected for inflation using the same method used in the literature.1
Prices were also converted to a common year (2015, the first year were prices for all goods
were collected) and a common currency (US dollars).
2.2.2 Trading Markets
In order to determine which pairs of markets are trading, I use the responses to a survey
of sixty-two managers of local transport companies. In the survey, managers were asked to
provide the origin and destination of the last trips of each of their drivers. Managers were
interviewed in four different occasions. The pairs of markets that I observe trading in the
data from local transport companies are denoted thereafter as “trading pairs”.
An alternative way of measuring trading pair and the corresponding results are presented
in Appendix.
Table 2.1 shows summary statistics of prices, price gaps and origin-destination distances.
Compared to the other countries studied in the literature, Liberia is relatively small. The
average distance between two trading pairs, for example, is close to 90 miles in Liberia,
compared to 221 in Ethiopia and 350 in Nigeria (as reported by Atkin and Donaldson 2015).
Despite Liberia being a smaller country, the average price gap between trading markets is
similar with those countries.
1For every location-product-month, the proportional price-change over the previous month is calculated.
For each month, the mean of all these changes is computed and used as the inflation rate.
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2.2.3 Distances and Travel Times
The first measure of distance used in this study is the distance in miles between two markets,
as estimated by Google Maps. Note that in Liberia, the road network is such that there is
often only one road between two markets. 2
The second measure of distance is the distance as measured in hours from one point to
another. There are two ways of estimating the time it takes to go from one market to another.
In addition to giving distances, Google Maps also provides an estimates of the time it would
take. While these estimated travel times are pretty accurate for some countries (such as the
United States), these estimates do not hold for countries such as Liberia. Besides, Google
Maps estimates do not vary with during the rainy season, when the rain causes road damages
and delays vehicles.
For these reasons, travel times were estimated directly from road users locally. A survey
of sixty-two managers of local transport companies provide estimates of the time needed
to transport goods from one market to another within Liberia. For every pair of markets,
managers were asked the average time it takes their vehicles to complete the trip, conditional
on their company operating on that road. They were asked for estimates of time during the
dry season as well as the rainy season. The time to complete the distance between the
two markets used in this study is then computed using the mean of estimates by managers,
separately for the dry and rainy season.
2.2.4 Transport Prices
Transport prices are reported by manager of transport companies. In the survey, managers
of transport companies were asked to report how much they charged for specific trips, what
commodities were transported, the capacity of the truck, and the destination and origin of
2The only route between two markets is thus the “quickest route”.
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the trip. Supposing that each truck is fully loaded, a price per ton is compiled for each trip.
Managers were reluctant to provide information on the prices they charge. By the end of the
survey, and after basic cleaning, information on prices was available for a little more than
100 trips.
2.3 Theoretical Framework
Since this paper compares trade costs in Liberia to estimates of trade costs in other estimated
in the literature, the theoretical framework in this paper follows closely the one developed
in Atkin and Donaldson (2015). In this section, I will only set out some key elements that
will be used in this study. The full framework and proofs can be found in the initial paper.
To estimate trade costs with price differences, the simplest equation to keep in mind is
P kdt − P kot = τ(Xkodt) + µkdt (2.1)
where P kdt−P kot is the spatial price gap between destination d and origin o for commodity
k at time t, τ(Xkodt) are intra-national trade costs over a route that has characteristics Xkodt
and µkdt is the mark-up charged by traders. Equation 2.1 states that the price gap is not
directly informative about estimated trade costs, since traders are charging mark-ups that
are included in prices. The framework by Atkin and Donaldson 2015 suggests a method to
overcome this challenge by:
1. Restricting origin-destination pairs to pairs that actually trade;
2. And making assumptions about the structure of the market, in order to estimate the
mark-up charged by intermediaries.
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2.3.1 Market Assumptions
The object of interest here is the extent to which trade costs τ(Xkodt) depend on some par-




). In order to properly estimation this from equation 2.1, four
assumptions are made on the structure of the market.
For notation purposes, the indexes for time period t and commodity k will be dropped
in this part, and inserted back when necessary.
Market Assumption 1
The cost to an intermediary selling qd units of a product from origin o in destination d is:
C(qd) = [Po + τ(Xd)]qd + Fd
This assumption states that an intermediary faces fixed costs Fd, buys every unit of
good at the origin price Po and the marginal cost of transporting the product from origin to
destination is τ(xd). Note that there is an underlying assumption here that the function τ
does not depend on the origin or the destination.
Market Assumption 2
In location d, there are md identical intermediaries selling the product who choose to supply
qd, maximizing their profits given the parameter θd = dQddqd (where Qd = mdqd). In addition,
the parameter φd = mdθd is fixed within a location d.
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Market Assumption 3
Consumer preferences take the form of the “constant pass-through inverse demand”:
Pd(Qd) =












ad − bd(Qd)δd if δd < 0 and ad ≥ 0, bd < 0, 0 < Qd <∞
where ad, bd and δd are demand parameters. Note that this inverse demand takes different
forms given the sign of δd, and the conditions on the total market quantity Qd ensure that
the price is positive.
The constant pass-through inverse demand preferences of Market Assumption 3 ensure
that the elasticity of the slope of the inverse demand curve Ed is constant at all prices. In the
context of this paper, the pass-through rate refers to the short-run pass-through rate: the
effect of a firm’s marginal cost on the price charged while holding competitiveness constant
(ρd ≡ ∂Pd∂cd where cd is the firm’s marginal cost). Market Assumptions 2 and 3 imply that this
pass-through rate is constant over quantities and only depends on two market characteristics:
the elasticity of the slope of the inverse demand (Ed) and the competitiveness of the market








where Ed(Pd) is the elasticity of the slope of inverse demand. Under Market Assumption








This class of preferences implies one main restriction: that the short-run pass-through
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rate does not change within a location in response to the total market quantity Qd supplied
there in equilibrium. This assumption is what allows the estimation of the pass-through rate.
Intermediaries chose the quantity supplied to maximize their profits, given their cost
C(qd) = [Po+ τ(Xd)]qd+Fd and facing the constant pass-through demand. Given that there
aremd identical intermediaries taking the parameter θd = dQddqd as given, and the pass-through
can be as function of market parameters (equation 2.2), we can write
Pd − Po = ρdτ(Xd) + (1− ρd)(ad − Po) (2.3)
where the (short-run) pass-through ρdis given by equation 2.2.
Inserting indexes for time period t and commodity k, equation 2.3 becomes:
P kdt − P kot = ρkodtτ(Xkodt) + (1− ρkodt)(akdt − P kot) (2.4)
Market Assumption 4






In order to estimate the pass-through rate and the effect of cost-shifters on trade costs, two
additional assumptions are made about trade costs and demand shifters.
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Estimation Assumption 1
Variation in trade costs τ(Xkodt) and local demand shifters akdt within destination d and over
time t is orthogonal to the variation in the origin price over time.
This assumption requires that the origin price P kot is not correlated with time-varying
shocks to trade costs and demand shifters at the destination. This would be the case if
for example prices of goods at origin are set by production costs, origin demand shocks, or
international markets.
Estimation Assumption 2
Demand-shifters akdt can be decomposed into time and destination fixed-effects, akdt = αkt +
αd + u
k
dt, and ukdt is uncorrelated with cost-shifters Xkodt.
2.3.3 Estimation




is done in two steps.
Step 1: Recover estimates of pass-through ρkod
Given the Estimation Assumption 1, equation 2.4 can be written:











where P kdt is the destination price, P kot is the origin price, γkod is a product-destination
fixed effect, and γkodt is a product-destination linear time trend and kdt is an unobserved
error term.
Variation of prices over time will allow the estimation of equation 2.5, and the estimation
of pass-through ρkod for each product-destination pair. For estimates to be unbiased, P kot is
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assumed to be not correlated with the trade costs τ(Xkodt).




Using the estimation of the pass-through from step 1, and the decomposition of demand-
shifters from Estimation Assumption 2 (akdt = αkt + αd + ukdt), equation 2.4 can be written
P kdt − ρ̂kodP kot
ρ̂kod













where ρ̂kod is the pass-through estimated from Step 1, αkt is a product-time fixed effect,αd is
a destination fixed-effect and ˜kdt is the error term. Equation 2.6 allows the non-parametrical
estimation of the effect of cost-shifters Xkodt on intra-national trade costs τ(Xkodt).
The underlying assumption that allows identification is that the function τ(.) does not
depend on time, origin, or destination. This means that variation of trade costs with cost-





) is a function of cost-shifters that is unique across origin-destination
pairs. Variation in cost-shifters across origin-destination pairs will allow the non-parametric
estimation of this function. If, for instance, the cost-shifter Xodt is distance, this assumption
states that an additional kilometer will have the same effect on trade costs for any given
road, at any point in time. In the next section, I argue that the time it takes to complete
the distance between origin and destination is a more accurate cost-shifter.
Note that the pass-through estimated in Step 1 corresponds to the response in price at
destination to a change in price at origin in the same month. This short-term response does
not capture effects of the long-term. For example, if the price of an imported good increases
in Monrovia due to an increase of the price of the good on the international market, the
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price of the good in other markets within Liberia will likely increase as well within the same
month, and this effect will be captured by the estimated pass-through. However, if the
effect of the increase in price in Monrovia on the price in other markets fades over time,
the estimated pass-through will fail to capture the long-term fading effect. In this case,
the pass-through estimated from equation 2.5 would be an over-estimate of the actual (or
long-term) pass-through, and the adjusted price-gap of Step 2 would be an under-estimate
of the actual adjusted price-gap. In the case where the over-estimation of pass-through is
correlated with cost-shifters, this will lead to a mis-measurement of the effect of cost-shifters
on trade costs. If, for example, price changes fade faster for places that are further away
than for places that are closer, the effect of distance on trade costs will be under-estimated.
In the rest of the paper, these long term effects are supposed to be negligible compared to
the short-term response, and I estimate pass-through with equation 2.5.
2.4 Estimates of Trade Costs in Liberia
In this section I present estimate of the extent to which trade costs vary with cost-shifters.
In a first part, I estimate the effect of distance on trade cost. As a robustness check for
the procedure, I replicate the key results found by Atkin and Donaldson 2015 and compare
results for Liberia with other countries. In a second part, I present estimates of the effect
of the time it takes to complete the distance (instead of the distance itself) on trade costs.
I find that the average speed of vehicles on the road partly explains differences between
Liberia and a developed country (the United States). This captures both the differences in
quality of the road, as well as the differences in the behavior of drivers.
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2.4.1 Effect of distance on trade costs
Here I present the effect of distance on trade costs and compare my results to the ones found
in Atkin and Donaldson 2015.
2.4.1.1 Key results
When applying the procedure to Liberian data, I find the same three key results.
Result 1
First, Atkin and Donaldson 2015 study the case with no pass-through adjustment on the
price gap, so that equation 2.6 is estimated with the price difference P kdt − P kot as the left
hand side:
P kdt − P kot = τ(xod) + αkt + αd + ˜kdt (2.7)
Where xod is the distance between origin and destination, αkt is a product-time fixed
effect,αd is a destination fixed-effect and ˜kdt is the error term.
They first estimate equation 2.7 using the absolute price gap between both all pairs
of markets and then using the price gap between only trading pairs (the pairs with all
destinations and their corresponding origins).3 They show that when the estimation is
restricted to trading pairs, estimates of the effect of distance on trade costs are bigger. I
show that this result holds for Liberia.
Figure 2.1 shows the non-parametric approximation plot of the price gap with respect to
distance (in logs). The bottom line, which plots absolute price gaps for all pairs, is increasing
in distance. The top line, which plots price gaps only for trading pairs, is increasing and
3For the estimation using all pairs, the absolute price gap is taken (because in the absence of information
on the origin of the good, there is no knowledge of the sign of P kdt − P kot). For the estimation using only
trading pairs, the price gap is taken, not the absolute value.
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steeper than the bottom line. This confirms the result that the approach using all pairs
underestimates trade costs.
A linear function appears to be a good approximation of the non-parametric relationship
presented in figure 2.1. Estimates of this linear approximation are presented in table 2.2. In
this table, the first column is the coefficient estimate of the absolute price gap between all
pairs of markets on the log distance. The coefficient is positive and significant. The second
column is the coefficient estimate of the price gap between trading pairs of markets on the
log distance. The coefficient is also positive and significant. In addition, the coefficient of the
second column is 1.6 times bigger than the coefficient in the second column. This estimate
is in the range of the results for Ethiopia and Nigeria presented by Atkin and Donaldson
2015.
Result 2
Step 1 of the estimation procedure (detailed in section 3.2 above) allows to have estimates
of pass-through for each origin-destination pair, for each commodity. Atkin and Donaldson
2015 show that most pass-through rates are positive and smaller than 1, with an average
of approximately 0.5, and that the pass-through is lower for destination markets that are
further away. I show that this results also holds for Liberia.
Figure 2.2 plots the pass-through rates ρkod for all products k and destination d. The lines
represent the non-parametric relationship between pass-through and log distance, with 95%
confidence intervals. The figure shows that the pass-through rates are on average smaller for
markets that are further away from the origin.
Result 3
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Atkin and Donaldson 2015 compare the coefficients estimated from equation 2.7 with
coefficients estimated when correcting for pass-through, with equation 2.6. They find that
when adjusting for pass-through, the coefficient is bigger. This implies that when not cor-
recting for the possibility of pass-through, the coefficient is under-estimating trade costs. I
show that this results also holds for Liberia.
Figure 2.3 shows this result. The top line is the non-parametric estimation of the price gap
adjusted for pass-through, between trading pairs, with respect to log distance. The bottom
line is the non-parametric estimation of the price gap (not adjusted for pass-through) between
trading pairs. The bottom line is a replication of the top line in figure 2.1, and is added
here for reference. Figure 2.3 shows that not adjusting for pass-through under-estimates the
trade costs.
Again, in Figure 2.3 it appears that a linear function is a good approximation for the
non-parametric approximation. Estimates of the linear approximation are presented in the
last column of table 2.2. This last column shows that when correcting for pass-through,
estimates of the effect of distance on trade costs are more than doubled. Again, this is in
the range of what Atkin and Donaldson 2015 find for Ethiopia and Nigeria.
2.4.1.2 Trade costs in Liberia




is the coefficient that
adjusts for pass-through, presented in column (3) of table 2.2. In comparison to the other
countries studied by Atkin and Donaldson 2015 (Ethiopia, Nigeria and the United States)
estimates for Liberia are much bigger. According to these estimates, Liberian trade costs are
more than twice as big as Nigerian trade costs, more than three times bigger than Ethiopian
trade costs, and thirteen times bigger than trade costs in the United States.4 While this
4Atkin and Donaldson 2015 find the following estimates: 0.0558 for Nigeria, 0.0374 for Ethiopia, and
0.0106 for the United States.
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might seem surprising, it in part reflects the poor quality of roads and logistics in Liberia,
which is much less developed than other countries studied.5 This is also consistent with
Teravaninthorn and Raballand 2009, who show that transport prices are particularly high
in West Africa.
While these results allow us to compare trade costs across countries, they do not allow
us to make any conclusions about the reason why these estimates differ across countries.
The next section tries to shed some light on one reason this might be: the time it takes to
complete a trip.
2.4.2 Effect of travel time on trade costs
While the distance metric in miles gives an accurate measure of the distance between two
markets, it does not adjust for road quality. A better metric for the distance adjusted for
road quality is the travel time. Table 2.3 shows the effect of travel time on trade costs.
Trade costs are estimated with the adjusted price gap between trading location pairs. Travel
times are estimated by managers of transport companies (as detailed in Section 2). The three
columns of table 2.3 show the effect of travel times on trade costs, for three different measures
of speed. In column (1) travel times have been calculated using the average speed over the
entire network. Note that for this estimates of speed, since average speed is constant across
routes and travel times are taken in logs, the estimate of the resulting estimate is equivalent
to the estimate using the log distance in miles. In fact, the coefficient in column (1) of table
2.3 is the same coefficient presented in column (3) of table 2.2.
Column (2) shows the effect of travel times on trade costs, were travel times are route-
specific. Every origin-destination pair is assigned the average of dry and rainy seasons
estimates of speed from the transport survey. The coefficient in column (2) is more than
5For example, Liberia is bellow Ethiopia and Nigeria in terms of Logistics Performance Index, according
to the World Bank. Also note that Liberia is not used as a passageway for landlocked countries and does
not benefit from such trade, which explains in part why infrastructure is not well developed.
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two times smaller than the coefficient in column (1). This means that the average speed
on the road plays an important role in explaining the impact of distance on trade costs. In
particular, the differences in speed across the network diminishes by half the effect of travel
time on trade costs. This difference in speed comes in part from differences in road quality,
which deteriorates the speed at which vehicles can go.
Column (3) shows the effect of travel times on trade costs, were travel times are route-
specific and adjusted for season. Estimates of speed are estimated from the survey, and
origin-destination-month observations are matched with estimates of speeds from the trans-
port survey, estimated separately for dry and rainy seasons. The coefficient in column (3) is
marginally smaller than the coefficient in column (2). This means that while the variation in
road quality across roads plays and important role in explaining the impact of travel times
on trade costs, the variability within a road across time does not play such an important
role.
This effect of travel time on trade costs was not captured in the past literature because
of lack of good estimates for speed. In the past, estimates of speed from Google Maps were
used. As shown in Appendix table B.2, taking Google Maps estimates for speed or taking the
network average speed. This is due to Google Maps not estimating travel times accurately
in some regions.
According to Section 4.1.2, the effect of distance on trade costs in Liberia is thirteen times
bigger than in the United States. Assuming that Google Maps estimates are accurate for the
United States, the effect of travel time on trade costs in Liberia is less than four times the
estimate of these effect in the United States (as estimated by Atkin and Donaldson 20156).
This means that the speed of vehicles on the road explains two thirds of the difference in
trade costs between Liberia and the United States.
6Atkin and Donaldson 2015 find that in the United States the effect of log travel time on the adjusted
price gap between trading pairs is 0.0167
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2.5 Robustness Checks
2.5.1 Robustness check: observed transport prices
The survey of managers provides estimates of transport prices charged by transport compa-
nies. The regression of these transport prices on the log of distance allow me to compare
the estimates of the effect of distance on trade costs using the price-gap method and the
observed transport prices.
Table 2.4 shows the result of the regression of the observed transport prices on log
distance. Observed prices have been cleaned using a method similar to the one used to clean
the prices data, as detailed in section 2. By definition, observed prices are observed for
trading pairs, so that the coefficient in table 2.4 is comparable to coefficients in table 2.2.
The coefficient of table 2.4 is in the same order of magnitude than the coefficients presented
in table 2.2. This shows that the price-gap method accurately estimates the price charged
by transport companies.7
Even if controlling for speed explains a good part of the difference between Liberia and
the United States, the effect of travel time on trade costs - according to the method suggested
by Atkin and Donaldson 2015 - is still four times bigger in Liberia than it is in the United
States. The following section goes further in trying to understand this difference.
2.5.2 A Direct Comparison of Marginal Costs
While the method suggested by Atkin and Donaldson 2015 to measure trade costs seems
to be doing a pretty good job for comparing trade costs across countries, it is important
7Note, however, that while tables 2.2 and 2.4 present similar estimates, the two are not directly compara-
ble. The observed transport prices are for trucks, and for commodities that span well beyond the ones used
in table 2.2.
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to understand why such discrepancies exist. In the previous section, I showed that speed
of vehicles seems to play a significant role in explaining such discrepancies. However, even
controlling for speed, differences remain. In this section, I compare reported marginal costs
of transport in Liberia and the United States, to point at potential reason why this might
be the case.
Very little data is available on transport costs. In the United States, the American
Transportation Research Institute Survey collects data through a survey of freight transport
companies and shares aggregated statistics annually. In particular, they publish average
marginal costs (in $ per km) for each input. I compare these marginal costs with data from
the survey of transport company managers in Liberia. Statistics for Liberia and the United
States are presented in table 2.5.
The total reported marginal cost in dollars per kilometer in Liberia is 2.6 times the
marginal cost in the United States. While this estimate is smaller than estimates from
section 4 above, it is in the same order of magnitude.
Table 2.5 indicates that almost every input is bigger by kilometer, except for toll and
insurance premiums which are non-existent in Liberia. However, the most striking differences
come from fuel, driver’s wage, truck purchase (or lease) and maintenance.
Fuel:
Liberia is not an oil producing country, and the government does not subsidize the price
of fuel. In addition, the trucks used in Liberia are older, and much more damaged than in
the United States. This explains the difference in fuel costs.
Divers’ Wage:
While the drivers’ wage per km in Liberia is much higher than in the United States, this
does not reflect the differences in income for both countries. Indeed, as the last row of table
2.5 indicates, the number of kilometers completed in each country is different. In terms of
yearly wage, drivers in the United States are paid more than ten times more than Liberian
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drivers. This goes back to the discussion on the average speed of vehicles.
Truck Purchase and Maintenance Costs:
Trucks are bought at a high price in Liberia. Often trucks are imported from Europe of
the United States. Credit constrained buyers invest in second-hand trucks for which they
have to pay shipping costs. Given the average numbers of kilometers completed per year,
these price of the truck per kilometer is significant.
Replacement parts are also rarely found locally and need to be imported. Even when
these parts are imported, local mechanics often do not know how to correctly maintain the
trucks in good working condition. In addition, trucks imported from developed countries
have often not been thought for Liberia’s roads.
The combination of the high price of fuel, trucks and maintenance with bad road quality
explains the discrepancy of transport costs between Liberia and the United States.
2.6 Conclusion
In Liberia, as in other countries of West Africa, transport costs are significantly bigger than
in other regions. Following the literature in estimating trade costs with commodity prices,
this paper confirms this result. In particular, I show that Liberia’s trade costs as a function
of distance are more than ten times bigger than in the United States. However, measuring
trade costs per distance may hide road-specific characteristics such as road quality.
A survey of transport companies in Liberia allows me to estimate vehicles’ average speed
on roads. Using that as a measure of road quality, I estimate trade costs as a function of
travel times. Estimates show that speed of vehicles can explain up to two thirds of the
difference in trade costs between Liberia and the United States. These results are consistent
with data on marginal costs reported directly by firms.
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Given this evidence, the straightforward solution to reduce transport costs would be to
upgrade the quality of roads. However, in the context of Liberia (the world’s fourteenth
rainiest country) the cost of roads that can withstand particularly strong rains and the cost
of their maintenance are particularly high. The government, which already contracted a loan
over 13 years for the last road investment project, is financially limited. In such a context,
we need more evidence on affordable solutions to increase the efficiency of trucking firms
and the speed of vehicles, such as the introduction of GPS trackers (e.g. Hubbard 2003;
de Rochambeau 2017).
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Figure 2.1: Price gaps and distance
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Figure 2.2: Estimated Pass-through rates for all goods and distance
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Figure 2.3: The effect of distance on intra-national trade costs
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Absolute Price Gap (All Pairs) 0.21
(0.25)
Price Gap (Trading Pairs) 0.07
(0.20)
Distance Between Locations (All Pairs, Miles) 214.27
(141.21)
Distance to Origin Location (Trading Pairs, Miles) 89.48
(122.33)
Log Distance to Origin Location (Trading Pairs, Log Miles) 4.89
(0.77)
Time as Estimated by Google Maps (All Pairs, Hours) 7.55
(3.75)
Time as Estimated by Managers - Dry Season (All Pairs, Hours) 62.26
(43.19)
Time as Estimated by Managers - Rainy Season (All Pairs, Hours) 130.02
(94.64)
Observations (All Pairs) 104211
Observations (Trading Pairs) 5081
The first row reports the mean price at the origin location of commodities. The second row reports
absolute price gaps using data from all location pairs. The third row reports price gaps only using
data from trading pairs. The fourth row reports distances between all location pairs. The fifth row
report distances between trading pairs. The sixth row report log-distances between trading pairs.
The seventh row reports the time it takes to complete trips between all pairs in hours as estimated
by Google Maps. The eighth row reports the time it takes to complete trips between all pairs in
hours, as estimated by managers of transport companies, during the dry season. The ninth row
reports the time it takes to complete trips between all pairs in hours, as estimated by managers of
transport companies, during the rainy season.
91








Log distance to origin (miles) 0.0399*** 0.0651*** 0.142***
(0.00235) (0.0147) (0.0200)
Observations 43708 1538 1366
Adjusted R2 0.382 0.233 0.962
* p<.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01. Standard errors in parentheses. Standard errors are clustered at the time-
product level. Column (1) uses data on the absolute price gap between all pairs of markets. Column (2)
uses data on the price gap between trading pairs, as determined by surveys of transport company managers.
Column (3) uses the price-gap adjusted with pass-through.
92
Table 2.3: Estimating the effect of travel time on intra-national trade costs








Log travel time 0.142*** 0.0669*** 0.0618***
(0.0200) (0.00896) (0.00890)
Observations 1366 1366 1366
Adjusted R2 0.962 0.964 0.964
* p<.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01. Standard errors in parentheses. Standard errors are clustered at the time-
product level. This table shows regressions of the adjusted price gap between trading locations on travel
time. Each column presents the coefficient for a difference measures of speed. Column (1) uses the average
speed across the Liberia road network. Column (2) uses the route-specific estimates of speed estimated
by the manager of transport companies. Speeds in column (2) are computed using the average of speed
estimates during the rainy and the dry season. Column (3) uses the same estimates as column (2), but
season-specific. In Liberia, the rainy season spans approximately from May to October.
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* p<.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01. Standard errors in parentheses. Standard errors are clustered at the
time-product level. This table presents the regression of the observed transport
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Fuel Costs 0.25 0.84 0.59
Driver Wages 0.31 0.68 0.37
Truck purchase or lease 0.143 0.449 0.306
Truck Repair/Maintenance 0.097 0.345 0.248
Permits and Licenses 0.012 0.074 0.062
Tires 0.027 0.072 0.045
Bribes N/A 0.043 0.043
Driver Benefits 0.081 0.1 0.019
Tolls 0.012 N/A -0.012
Truck Insurance Premiums 0.057 N/A -0.057
TOTAL - Marginal Cost 0.989 2.603 1.614
Price Charged ($ per km) 2.77
km completed by a truck in a year 98,543 5,742
Data for the United States comes from the American Transportation Research Institute Survey of




and Effort: Evidence from Liberia’s
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3.1 Introduction
Discrimination can reduce the probability that firms led by non-elite managers—for example
those who do not belong to a dominant race or ethnic group—win contracts. However, even
when such bias is limited or absent, non-elite firms expecting to be discriminated against
may be discouraged from bidding on contracts. In such a scenario, policymakers often
provide programs that encourage and facilitate bidding on contracts, expecting non-elite
firms to especially benefit. However, how the impact of such programs varies with expected
discrimination is in fact theoretically ambiguous. On one hand, firms who believe that they
are being discriminated against often have lower chances of winning tenders even in the
absence of discriminations—for example because of limited production experience. On the
other hand, such firms also have less experience in applying to contracts and could therefore
benefit more from the program.
In this paper we evaluate the impact of a training that teaches Liberian firms how to
apply to tenders and how the impact varies with the firm’s beliefs about discrimination. We
work with a non-profit that provides the training. Firms in the treatment group are visited
at the beginning of the experiment and given a free voucher to attend the training. Firms
are also given information on how the training appears to have been beneficial for past for
firms similar to theirs who took it.
The encouragement (voucher+information) successfully persuaded many firms to take
the training. Firms who took the training are also more likely to win contracts, and the
contracts they win are of higher quality. For example, treated firms are more likely to win
a contract with a foreign buyer.
We then explore how the impact varies with firms’ beliefs about discrimination. We
develop a simple model that demonstrates why the sign and form of this heterogeneity is ex
ante ambiguous. In the model, firms who believe they are being discriminated against are
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on average also of lower ability or production experience, and therefore have lower chances
of winning tenders. These firms are thus less likely to apply to tenders and less experienced
in preparing bids. The model predicts that the effect of the training on the effort provided
by the firms is a U-shaped function of expected discrimination. For firms in low ranges
of expected discrimination, the effect of the training counter-balances the effect of higher
expected discrimination. In higher ranges of expected discrimination, the effect of higher
expected discrimination dominates and more discriminated firms are less likely to provide
additional effort in response to the training. We then show that the empirical evidence
supports this prediction.
Given Liberia’s complex ethnic and class history, it is not uncommon that firms expect
to be discriminated against when they apply to tenders. This paper will focus on two
particular groups of firms that are thought to be favored: Americo-Liberian firms—those led
by managers who are either descendants of the freed slaves to founded Liberia and became
the country’s economic elite, or who have assimilated into that group1—and Lebanese firms.
Firms who are not from either group are more likely to expect to be discriminated against
in a tender process, and less likely to submit bids and win tenders. However, conditional on
submitting a bid, such non-elite firms are not less likely to win.2
One of the challenges faced by the literature that studies discrimination is that dis-
crimination is rarely perfectly observed. In this paper, we measure whether firms expect
discrimination. Theory makes clear that, rather than true discrimination, it is in fact indi-
viduals’ and firms’ beliefs about discrimination that should influence their actions (Cullen
and Perez-Truglia 2017; Dizon-Ross 2017; Cavallo et al. 2017). We then show that the
heterogeneity in the impact of the treatment supports the predictions of the model. For
1In this paper we define two groups of firms: natives and non-natives. Firms are identified as natives
if they speak at least one of Liberia’s indigenous languages. While most Americo-Liberians are in the
non-natives group, the definition is broad and also includes other firms.
2These results on elite versus non-elite firms are based on data collected prior to the experiment.
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elite firms—Americo-Liberian and Lebanese firm, who are in the lower ranges of expected
discrimination—the effect of the treatment is bigger for firms who feel more discriminated
against. However, this effect reverses for native firms, who are in the higher ranges of dis-
crimination.
Endogenous responses by those being discriminated against have played a central role in
the theoretical literature on discrimination in economics. Lundberg and Startz 1983, Akerlof
1984, and Coate and Loury (1993) famously showed that discrimination can become a “self-
fulfilling prophecy”. That is, even if elite decisionmakers start out with “low” beliefs about
non-elite subjects that are in fact incorrect, those beliefs may become true over time as non-
elite subjects’ rational response to discrimination is to lower effort and therefore accumulate
less experience or human capital. Empirical evidence on how non-elite subjects respond to
discrimination is scarce, however. Closest to this paper is Glover et al. (2016), who show that
biased managers discourage minority grocery store employees’ effort (see also Bartoš et al.
2016 and Halac and Prat 2016). We instead study firms whose past experience—fulfilling
contracts—have a clearer link to current capabilities. This paper is also to our knowledge
the first to link direct measures of subjects’ beliefs about discrimination to their effort in a
field experiment. This is important for two reasons. First, we separate the role subjects’
beliefs about discrimination (“the relative”) play from that of e.g. the degree to which they
are monitored (“the level”). Second, beliefs can be, and often are (DellaVigna 2009), wrong.
Beliefs about discrimination may for example plausibly respond with a lag to changes in
true discrimination. In such a scenario this paper suggests that discrimination can become a
“self-fulfilling prophecy” not only through the beliefs of the discriminators, but also through
the beliefs of the discriminated.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents Liberia’s context and
Section 3 presents the recruitment of firms, treatment, and data collection. Section 4 looks
at the average effect of the treatment for all firms. Section 5 presents the model and Section
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6 shows empirical evidence that support the prediction of the model. Section 7 concludes.
3.2 Background
Liberia has a complex historical background that makes it particularly well suited to study
expected discrimination. In this paper, we will focus on discrimination over two dimensions:
ethnic origins and nationality.
3.2.1 Ethnicities in Liberia
The Republic of Liberia began as a settlement of the American Colonization Society, who
believed that free black people should return to the continent they originated from. Starting
the mid 1820s, more than 13,000 formerly enslaved or free-born African-Americans settled
in Liberia. These African-Americans - later known as Americo-Liberians - and their descen-
dants led the political, educational and economic sectors of Liberia since its independence in
1847 and until the first civil war in 1980. Unlike similar migrants in neighboring countries,
Americo-Liberians rarely intermarried with indigenous West Africans. Economic and social
gaps between Americo-Liberians and the indigenous populations of Liberia persisted through
history and are still present today to a minor degree.
In this paper, we make the distinction between native and non-native Liberians by looking
at the languages people speak. Natives are defined as speaking at least one indigenous
language, while non-natives only speak the language of Americo-Liberians: Liberian English.
Note that this definition of natives is stricter than the group defined as the descendants of
indigenous Liberians. Indeed, today Liberians speak one local language only if they have
kept ties with their family inland (were indigenous languages are spoken). However some
Liberians descend from indigenous ethnicities but have emigrated to the capital (for example,
during the civil war), and have not kept contact with their inland communities. While these
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people will be categorized here as “non-natives”, they might descend directly from indigenous
ethnicities.
3.2.2 The Lebanese Diaspora
A flow of Lebanese migrants has been arriving to West Africa since the 19th century. While
some of these migrants emigrated by choice, others were fleeing the Lebanese civil war. The
number of Lebanese in Liberia is unknown but their economic success has not gone unnoticed.
Factors that have contributed to their success are said to be the worldwide trade network
among Lebanese, good access to financial services such as family loans, and connexions to
political elites.
Many Liberians see the development of Lebanese businesses in their country as bitter-
sweet. On one hand, increasing Lebanese investments in Liberia has created and influx of
capital and economic opportunities. On the other hand Lebanese businesses are being ac-
cused of stealing opportunities from Liberians through an unfair competitive advantage -
better access to finance, trading partners and political elites. Many Liberians believe the
Lebanese community is unfairly favored and should be restrained. A good example of this
resentment is the support for the Liberian nationality law which requires being black as a
prerequisite to citizenship. This law bars the Lebanese from the Liberian nationality, and
by extension, to vote and own land. In recent years, the law has gained the support of some
Liberians who want to restrain the Lebanese population’s rights, despite the law being called
overtly racist by human right activists and, more recently, by Liberia’s own president.
3.3 Experimental Design
We work with a local NGO that teaches firms how to bid on tenders, and we provide a free
voucher for this training to a randomly chosen sample of firms. This experiment allows us
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to measure the effect of the training on firm behavior and outputs.
3.3.1 Sample
Our sample of firms was recruited with the help of a local NGO, Building Markets. The
organization’s goal is to connect local small and medium-sized enterprises to supply chains
and investments. Among other services, Building Markets publishes online a directory of
local businesses.
In addition to this directory, Building Markets provides various trainings to local busi-
nesses. One of these trainings is about the bidding process in Liberia. To be in the sample
of firms selected for the study, firms had to satisfy four criteria: i) be on Building Markets’
business directory, ii) have never taken the training on bidding, iii) have at least one em-
ployee in addition to the owner and iv) be located in Monrovia. In addition, Since a lot of
businesses closed after the Ebola crisis, only firms who had been in contact with Building
Markets post ebola crisis (after April 2015) were kept in the sample.
Building Markets keeps track of these businesses, and the data they collect allows us
to have a better idea of the sample of firms in our experiment. Table 3.1 shows summary
statistics of the sample of firms. The sample represents various sectors with almost one
fourth of firms in the sample in “Construction and Renovation”. The vast majority of firms
have at least one Liberian owner, while 5% have at least one Lebanese owner. 36% of the
managers speak at least one local language and in the context of this paper are categorized
as native Liberians. 21% of firms applied to at least one tender in the 6 months before being
interviewed, and 12% were successful in winning at least one contract through a bid. The
average “success rate” (the number of contracts won through a bid divided by the number
of bids submitted) is 32%.
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3.3.2 Treatment
Firms in the sample were randomly sorted into treatment (772 firms) and control (420
firms). The randomization was stratified on the number of employees, sector and zone
within Monrovia. The sample is balanced, as shown in Table 3.2.
Firms in the treatment group were visited in June 2016 and offered a free voucher to
attend Building Markets’s training. The voucher allowed one person from the firm to attend
Building Market’s training on bidding for free. The voucher was valid as soon as they were
handed to the firms and did not have an expiration date. When they were visited, firms
were also asked to answer a survey and were given information about the training. This
information included the training’s content, as well as statistics on the effect of the training
on firms like theirs.
Building Markets’ training on bidding is divided in two sections. The first section lasts
one week and is referred to as the “General Procurement” training. This training teaches
firms the fundamentals of the bidding process, such as how to find tenders, how to apply and
common requirements. This first week of training is a requirement for the second section
called the “Bid Compilation” training. This second section lasts two days and is a hands-
on toolkit to producing bids. During this session, participants are asked to prepare a bid
proposal for a mock tender.
Building Markets offers two to three training sessions per month, depending on the
demand for training. The firms who were encouraged to take the training as part of the
experiment did so from June 2016 to January 2017. Figure 3.1 shows the timeline of the
experiment.
3.3.3 Data Collection
The analysis in this paper is based on three datasets: pre-baseline, baseline, and endline.
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The first dataset was collected by Building Markets. Firms on Building Markets’ online
directory are asked to answer a phone survey every three to six months. The data collected
through these phone surveys has been made available to the research team and is what we
will subsequently refer to as pre-baseline data.
The second dataset was collected in June 2016, when firms of the treatment group were
visited and given a voucher. Firms of the treatment group were also asked to answer a
survey, which we will refer to as the baseline data. Note that this dataset only contains
information on firms in the treatment group.
Lastly, an endline interview of all firms was conducted from March to June 2017. Out of
the 1,192 firms of the sample, the research team could contact 831 firms: 295 firms in the
control group, and 533 firms of the control group.
Figure 3.2 summarizes the number of firms in each step of the process. Firms who
answered the endline survey are slightly different from firms who did not, but this did not
alter the balance between treatment and control groups. Table C.3 of the Appendix shows
differential attrition and Tables C.1 and C.2 show summary statistics and balance table for
firms in the restricted sample who answered the endline interview.
3.4 Effect of Training on Firm Behavior and Outputs
In this section, we explore the average effect of treatment on firm behavior and output. We
expect firms who received a free voucher to be more likely to attend training on bidding and
be more successful at winning contracts. In later sections, we explore the heterogeneity of
this effect.
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3.4.1 Access to training
Firms in the treatment group are significantly more likely to attend training. Table 3.3
shows the coefficients of the regression of training attendance on assignment to treatment.
Different columns show results for different types of training.
Column (1) looks at the effect of treatment on whether firms attended Building Markets’
first session of training on bidding: the General Procurement training. The coefficient shows
that treatment increased the probability of attending Building Markets’ General Procure-
ment training by 25 percent. While 26 percent of the firms of the treatment group (who
were given a voucher) went to the General Procurement training, 4 of the firms of the control
group took the training (despite not receiving a free voucher).
Column (2) shows the same coefficient but for Building Markets’ second session of training
on bidding: the Bid Compilation training. The first session of training (General Procure-
ment) is a prerequisite for the second session. Given that almost all the firms who took the
first session of training also took the second session (85 percent), the coefficient in column
(2) is similar to the coefficient in column (1) coefficient: treatment increased the probability
of attending the second session of training by 22 percent.
Columns (1) and (2) are based on Building Markets training attendance sheet. Column
(3) looks at the effect of treatment on self-reported training attendance. This includes any
type of training, including Building Markets’ training on bidding. The coefficient is smaller
than in previous columns, but still significant at 14 percent.
3.4.2 Tenders and contracts
Treatment significantly increased the number of bids submitted and the number of contracts
won.
Table 3.4 shows the effect of assignment to treatment on firm behavior and outputs.
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Treatment did not significantly increase the number of bids submitted. However, treatment
firms are more successful at winning contracts through tenders (column (2)) as well as win-
ning contracts won without bidding (column (3)). This is reflected in the effect of treatment
on the total number of contracts won (column (4)). Firms in the treatment group also have
“higher quality” contracts. Indeed, treatment increased the number of firms who won a
contract of more than 6 months as well as the number of firms who work with international
clients. Treatment on the treated coefficients are similar in significance and are presented in
Table C.4 of the Appendix.
Overall, while treatment seems to not have affected the number of bids submitted by
firms, it did increase the number of contracts won and the quality of those contracts. The
next sections explore the heterogeneity of this effect with respect to expected discrimination.
3.5 Theoretical Framework
In the presence of discrimination, the effect of a training that teaches firms how to apply
to tenders is ambiguous. Conditional on bidding, firms who are being discriminated have
lower chances of winning tenders, and are thus less likely to apply to begin with. These firms
are thus not experienced in preparing bids, and training might be particularly beneficial for
them. Whether the effect of the training counter-balances the effect of discrimination is not
clear. In this section we present a model that predicts the effect of such a training.
Suppose that a firm is facing tender for a contract of value V . The firm has an expected
discrimination θ and must decide what effort e it wants to put in the preparation of the bid. It
believes that the probability of winning the contract is q(e, θ). This probability is increasing
in the effort provided by the firm (∂q
∂e
> 0) and decreasing in the expected discrimination
(∂q
∂θ
< 0). In addition, we also suppose that ∂2q
∂2e
< 0 and that ∂2q
∂e∂θ
is a negative constant
( ∂2q
∂e∂θ
= −β < 0). This last condition states that the more discrimination the firm expects
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there is, the lower it believes the returns to effort are. Providing effort e costs the firm a
linear cost ce.
In such conditions, the firm is facing the following problem:
max
e
[q(e, θ)V − ce]







To know how the optimal level of effort varies with the expected discrimination, we can














< 0), we can conclude from equation 3.2 that ∂e?
∂θ
< 0. This means that the bigger the
expected discrimination, the lower the effort provided by the firm. This does not come as a
surprise given that returns to effort are decreasing in expected discrimination.
Now suppose that a treatment is delivered to the firm, which lowers the cost of providing
effort. We suppose that the effects of such a training depends on how the firms is expected
to be discriminated in such a way that the treatment is most efficient for firms with high
expected discrimination. This comes from the idea that discriminated firms have less ex-
perience in applying to tenders, and benefit more from the training. We denote α(θ) the
marginal reduction in cost from the treatment, with α′(θ) > 0 and α′′(θ) < 0.
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The firm is now facing a new problem
max
e
[q(e, θ)V − (1− α(θ))ce]







At this point we can note that for every given level of θ, the new optimal level of effort
derived from equation 3.3 is bigger than the previous optimal level of effort derived from
equation 2.1. This comes from ∂2q
∂2e
< 0 and it means that providing treatment increases the
average level of effort provided by the firm.
Now we can explore heterogeneity. To know how the new optimal level of effort varies






























Or in other terms
∂e?
∂θ
< 0⇔ α′(θ) < βV
c
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Since α′′(θ) < 0, α′(θ) is decreasing and there exists a threshold θ0 such that
∀θ | θ < θ0, ∂e?∂θ > 0
∀θ | θ ≥ θ0, ∂e?∂θ ≤ 0
This means that for firms in low ranges of discrimination, more discriminated firms have
lower chances of winning tenders but also low costs of applying to tenders which counter-
balance this effect, and they end up applying to more tenders. For firms in high ranges of
discrimination, more discriminated firms have lower chances of winning tenders, but their
costs of applying to tenders are not so low that they counterbalance this effect.
The following section presents the heterogeneity of the results with respect to expected
discrimination.
3.6 Heterogeneity
The empirical findings confirm the conclusions of the model presented in the previous section.
Firms who feel the most discriminated against have higher returns to training, but only when
their initial beliefs about about discrimination are in the higher ranges.
3.6.1 Expected Discrimination
To measure expected discrimination, we asked firms of the treatment group whether they
felt discriminated against. During the baseline survey, before they were give the voucher,
firms of the treatment group were asked to answer the following question: “In you sector,
do you think that some people are favored?”. Follow-up Enumerators who administered the
survey were trained to ask this part of the survey in a neutral way.
Table 3.5 shows statistics about discrimination. 30 percent of firms feel that some people
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are being favored in this survey. More than half of these firms (18 percent of the total sample)
believe that Lebanese are being favored. The other groups of people who are thought to be
favored are Americo-Liberians (6 percent), Chinese (4 percent) and Indians (2 percent).
Firms were then asked to rate from 0 (strongly disagree) to 10 (strongly agree) whether
they agreed with statements about how these firms are being favored. The highest rated
statement is “The win tenders, but it’s unfair” at 8.62.
We base our measure of discrimination on whether firms answered positively to the
question “In you sector, do you think that some people are favored?”. However, by definition,
this information is only available for the treatment group. In order to project it to the control
group, we run a logit regression of the answer on baseline characteristics for the treatment
group, and use the characteristics of the control group to predict what their answers would
have been likely to be.
Table 3.6 presents the coefficients of the logit regression. Firms who speak at least
one Liberian local language (the native firms) are more likely to be report discrimination.
Some sectors, such as construction and renovation, are more likely to report discrimination,
while other sectors such as handicrafts and artisans are less likely to report it. We use
these coefficients to compute the fitted values of the regression. This fitted values create an
index which represents the probability that a firm reports discrimination given its baseline
characteristics. We call this index the “Discrimination Index”, and use it as a proxy for
expected discrimination.
Figure 3.3 plots the histogram of the discrimination index for native Liberians and non-
native Liberians. The average discrimination index is at 0.30. As expected, native Liberians
are more likely to report discrimination than non-native Liberians. We use this result to
explore the heterogeneity in the effect of the treatment separately for native and non-natives.
This allows us to explore discrimination separately for two groups that are not discriminated
to the same extent. In the following section, we explore further the differences at baseline
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between these two groups - natives and non-natives.
3.6.2 Baseline Comparisons
Table 3.7 presents a comparison between native and non-native firms at baseline, before the
experiment. At baseline, native and non-native Liberians do not operate in the same sectors.
While non-native Liberians are more likely to operate in business and consulting services
sector, native Liberians are more likely to operate in sectors such as food and beverages, or
handicrafts and artisans. Non-natives are also more likely to have applied to bids in the past
in the past six months, and more likely to have won contracts through bids.
These results provide further support to the previous result that natives are more dis-
criminated against than non-natives. Indeed, they win fewer contracts through bids, and
they internalize this by applying to fewer bids.
3.6.3 Heterogeneity of the treatment
In this section we explore heterogeneity in the effect of the treatment for natives and non-
natives, and along the expected discrimination of firms (as measured by the discrimination
index).
Table 3.8 shows the heterogeneity of the treatment on training attendance. Columns (1)
to (4) refer to Building Markets’ first training session, General Procurement, and columns
(5) to (8) refer to the second session, Bid Compilation. Columns (2) and (6) show that
treatment increased attendance of training for both natives and non-natives. Column (3)
and (7) shows that treatment increased attendance particularly for firms who have a high
discrimination index. This means that firms who are more likely to feel discriminated given
their baseline characteristics are also the firms that are more likely to attend the training
when given a voucher. Columns (4) and (5) show that this effect - that the effect of treatment
increases with expected discrimination - is similar for native and non-native Liberians.
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Table 3.9 shows the heterogeneity of the training on whether the firm applies to tenders.
Using the heterogeneity as previously, columns (4) and (8) of Table 3.9 show that the firms
who benefited the most from the training are the non-native firms who felt the most discrim-
inated. This confirms the prediction of the model that the effort of the firm (in this case,
applying to tenders) increases with expected discrimination, but only if the firm is in a low
range of expected discrimination (in this case, being non-native). For native Liberians, the
effect is negatively correlated with the discrimination index, though not significant.
Figure 3.4 illustrates this result. The top panel shows the heterogeneity of the results
for non-native Liberians. Each point corresponds to the coefficient of the the effect of the
training for a particular quantile of the discrimination index. The pictures shows that the
effect of the training is bigger for bigger quantiles. The bottom panel shows the same graph
for native Liberians. Here, the effect of the training is smaller for bigger quantiles.
These results confirm the predictions of the model. For low ranges of expected dis-
crimination (non-native Liberians) the effect of training on effort is increasing in expected
discrimination. For high ranges of expected discrimination (native-Liberians) the effect of
the training on effort is decreasing in expected discrimination.
Table 3.10 shows that these results are reflected in the number of contracts won. Columns
(4) and (8) of Table 3.10 show that the effect of the training on whether firms win contracts
and on the number of contracts won through tenders is the strongest for non-native Liberians
who are more likely to feel discriminated against. This result is illustrated in Figure 3.5.
The effect of the training is increasing in discrimination index for the top panel (non-native
Liberians), and decreasing for the bottom panel (native-Liberians).
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3.7 Conclusion
If a firm expects to be discriminated against, it believes that her returns to effort are lower
and, it provides a lower level of effort. To help these firms, many government or organizations
provide training to teach them to apply to tenders. While this training increases their returns
to effort, how the effect of such a program varies with expected discrimination is ambiguous.
This paper shows that the effect of a training that teaches firms how to apply to tenders is
a U-shaped function of expected discrimination. or firms in low ranges of expected discrimi-
nation, the effect of the training counter-balances the effect of higher expected discrimination.
In higher ranges of expected discrimination, the effect of higher expected discrimination dom-




This Figure shows the timeline of the experiment evaluated in this paper. The experiment
spanned from June 2016 to June 2017, with some pre-baseline interviews conducted before
April 2016 by an outside source.
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Figure 3.2: Randomization Design
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This Figure shows the number of firms in the sample at every step of the experiment. Open
baseline firms are the firms who were in Building Markets’ directory, woh never took the
training, who have at least one employee and who are located in Monrovia. These firms were
randomly selected for treatment or control. For the endline survey, the research team tried
to reach these firms and was able to track down and interview only a subsample. Out of
the 533 firms who interviewed at endline that were in the treatment group (the encouraged
firms), 142 firms had taken the training.
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Figure 3.3: Histogram of the discrimination index, for native Liberians and non-native Liberi-
ans
This graph shows the discrimination index for native and non-native Liberians. The dis-
crimination is the fitted value of a logit regression of reported discrimination on baseline
characteristics, and projected on the control group. Native firms are defined as speaking at
least one local Liberian language.
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Figure 3.4: Heterogeneity of the effect of the treatment on number of bids for native and
non-native Liberians
This Figure shows the effect of the treatment on the number of bids submitted by firms in
six months preceding the interview. Both panels plot the coefficients of the effect of the
training for different quantiles of the Discrimination Index. The top panel shows the effect
for native Liberians, the bottom panel shows the effect for non-native Liberians.
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Figure 3.5: Heterogeneity of the effect of the treatment on number of contracts for native
and non-native Liberians
This Figure shows the effect of the treatment on the number of contracts won through tenders
in the six months preceding the interview. Both panels plot the coefficients of the effect of
the training for different quantiles of the Discrimination Index. The top panel shows the
effect for native Liberians, the bottom panel shows the effect for non-native Liberians.
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Table 3.1: Summary Statistics
Mean SD Observations
Sectors
Construction and Renovation 0.23 (0.42) 1192
Food and Beverages 0.16 (0.36) 1192
Home Essentials 0.13 (0.33) 1192
Handicrafts and Artisans 0.11 (0.32) 1192
Business and Consulting Services 0.09 (0.29) 1192
Owner Nationality
Liberian 0.90 (0.30) 1192
Lebanese 0.05 (0.21) 1192
Nigerian 0.02 (0.14) 1192
Indian 0.01 (0.11) 1192
Other
Total Number of Employees 14.19 (42.62) 1187
Submitted a bid in the past 6 months (Y=1; N=0) 0.21 (0.40) 847
Number of bids submitted in the past 6 months 0.65 (1.62) 847
Won a contract through a bid in the past 6 months (Y=1; N=0) 0.12 (0.32) 876
Number of contracts won through bids in the past 6 months 0.30 (1.16) 876
Ever won a contract of six months or more 0.76 (0.43) 179
Proportion of bids won (conditional on applying) 0.32 (0.37) 174
Speaks at least one Liberian local language 0.34 (0.47) 1192
This table presents summary statistics of firms in the sample. The data is based on phone
interviews conducted by Building Markets, a Liberian local NGO. A nationality of the busi-
ness is determined if at least one of the owners has that particular nationality. The number
of employees includes the owner or manager of the firm.
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Table 3.2: Balance Table
Diff.
(T - C) Std. Error P-Val.
Sectors
Construction and Renovation 0.0022 0.0256 0.9314
Food and Beverages 0.0167 0.0220 0.4489
Home Essentials -0.0029 0.0202 0.8848
Handicrafts and Artisans -0.0027 0.0194 0.8900
Business and Consulting Services -0.0046 0.0176 0.7950
Owner Nationality
Liberian 0.0152 0.0180 0.3989
Lebanese 0.0038 0.0126 0.7649
Nigerian 0.0017 0.0085 0.8440
Indian 0.0034 0.0065 0.5999
Other
Total Number of Employees 1.7768 2.5936 0.4934
Submitted a bid in the past 6 months (Y=1; N=0) -0.0042 0.0292 0.8852
Number of bids submitted in the past 6 months 0.0329 0.1168 0.7784
Won a contract through a bid in the past 6 months (Y=1; N=0) 0.0016 0.0231 0.9445
Number of contracts won through bids in the past 6 months -0.1129 0.0824 0.1708
Ever won a contract of six months or more 0.0398 0.0680 0.5591
Proportion of bids won (conditional on applying) 0.0171 0.0588 0.7717
Speaks at least one Liberian local language -0.0046 0.0288 0.8741
This table presents balance between firms of the treatment and control groups. The data
is based on phone interviews conducted by Building Markets, a Liberian local NGO. A
nationality of the business is determined if at least one of the owners has that particular
nationality. The number of employees includes the owner of the firm.
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Treatment 0.251*** 0.219*** 0.140***
(0.0203) (0.0192) (0.0365)
Control Mean 0.013 0.010 0.507
Observations 828 828 789
Standard errors are in parentheses and are robust. This table presents coefficients of the regression
of training take-up on encouragement. The three columns present three different trainings. Column
(1) refers to the “General Procurement” training. This training is delivered by Building Markets and
teaches basic knowledge to find and apply to tenders. Column (2) refers to the “Bid Compilation”
training, also delivered by Building Markets. During this training attendees are presented a fake
tender and asked to prepare a bid. The Global Procurement training is a requirement for the Bid
Compilation training. Building Market tracks who attends training so that columns (1) and (2)
are not self-reported. Column (3) refers to any training, as self-reported by the firm.
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Table 3.4: Effect of Treatment on Firm Behavior




















Treatment 0.116 0.0839* 0.175* 0.259** 0.102*** 0.0942**
(0.0765) (0.0439) (0.0955) (0.107) (0.0342) (0.0394)
Controls X X X X X X
Control Mean 0.255 0.083 0.310 0.394 0.176 0.231
Observations 604 604 604 604 604 604
Standard errors are in parentheses and are robust. Controls include employment at baseline, sector,
counties of operation, origin and gender of the owner, geographical zone, and baseline information
on bids submitted. The first four variables are evaluated in the 6 months preceding the interview.
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Table 3.5: Statistics on Expected Discrimination
Mean SD Observations
In your sector, do you think that some people are favored? 0.30 (0.46) 588
Thinks Lebanese are being favored 0.19 (0.39) 588
Thinks Americo-Liberians are being favored 0.06 (0.24) 588
Thinks Chinese are being favored 0.04 (0.19) 588
Thinks Indians are being favored 0.02 (0.14) 588
Rate from 0 to 10 the following statements
They win the tenders, but it’s unfair. 8.62 (2.00) 177
They make competition very hard for people outside of their group. 8.58 (2.11) 177
They pay less import taxes. 5.19 (2.96) 177
They pay less revenue taxes. 5.15 (3.14) 177
This table presents statistics on discrimination based on the baseline interview of firms in
the treatment group. If firms responded positively to the first question, they were asked
further questions about the group who was being favored and it what way they thought that
group was being favored.
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Table 3.6: Logit regression of expected discrimination on baseline characteristics
Feels Discriminated Against (Y=1; N=0)
Speaks at least one Liberian local language 0.474**
(0.223)
Business and Consulting Services -0.187
(0.401)
Construction and Renovation 0.649**
(0.287)
Food and Beverages -0.470
(0.337)








Number of bids submitted in the past 6 months 0.0408
(0.0292)




Standard errors are in parentheses and are robust. This table presents the result of the logit
regression of a dummy variable that takes the value 1 when the manager answers positively
to the question “In your sector, do you think that some people are favored?”. This question
was asked when firms were visited for treatment, so that this regression only includes firms
from the treatment group who were encouraged. The regression includes sector, nationality
of the owner, and business characteristics (such as the number of tenders submitted in the
past six months and the number of contracts won).
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Table 3.7: Comparison of native and non-native Liberians at baseline
Non-Natives Natives Diff. P-Val.
Sectors
Construction and Renovation 0.23 0.23 0.0030 0.9067
Food and Beverages 0.13 0.20 -0.0683*** 0.0020
Home Essentials 0.12 0.14 -0.0198 0.3297
Handicrafts and Artisans 0.09 0.17 -0.0861*** 0.0000
Business and Consulting Services 0.11 0.06 0.0509*** 0.0040
Owner Nationality
Liberian 0.88 0.94 -0.0622*** 0.0006
Lebanese 0.06 0.02 0.0391*** 0.0021
Nigerian 0.02 0.01 0.0083 0.3362
Indian 0.02 0.00 0.0179*** 0.0066
Other
Total Number of Employees 14.57 13.45 1.1178 0.6688
Submitted a bid in the past 6 months (Y=1; N=0) 0.29 0.21 0.0728* 0.0539
Number of bids submitted in the past 6 months 0.77 0.54 0.2318* 0.0558
Won a contract through a bid in the past 6 months (Y=1; N=0) 0.15 0.10 0.0409 0.1593
Number of contracts won through bids in the past 6 months 0.24 0.14 0.1045** 0.0479
Ever won a contract of six months or more 0.24 0.20 0.0362 0.3121
Proportion of bids won (conditional on applying) 0.33 0.34 -0.0088 0.9032
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(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Treatment 0.250*** 0.138** 0.215*** 0.0508
(0.0270) (0.0596) (0.0249) (0.0529)
Treatmentx
Non-Native Liberian 0.275*** 0.181** 0.221*** 0.0999
(0.0339) (0.0746) (0.0313) (0.0683)
Treatment x
Native Liberian 0.217*** 0.0171 0.207*** -0.0591
(0.0411) (0.0916) (0.0365) (0.0825)
Treatment x








Discrimination Index 0.653** 0.865***
(0.285) (0.254)
Controls X X X X X X X X
Control Mean 0.017 0.017 0.017 0.017 0.013 0.013 0.013 0.013
Observations 632 632 613 613 632 632 613 613
Standard errors are in parentheses and are robust. Controls include employment at baseline, sector,
counties of operation, origin and gender of the owner, geographical zone, and baseline information
on bids submitted. The discrimination index was computed with fitted values of a logit regression of
the dummy variable that equals one when the firm reported discrimination at baseline, on baseline
characteristics. The estimates of the parameters were computed using the treatment group, and
the fitted values were computed for the entire sample. All regressions include the discrimination
index as well as the interaction between the discrimination index and whether the firm is Native
Liberian.
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Table 3.9: How Treatment Affects Firms’ Bidding Behavior
Submitted a Bid in the
Past 6 Months (Y/N)
Number of Bids Submitted
In the Past 6 Months
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Treatment 0.00854 -0.0654 0.102 -0.110
(0.0308) (0.0789) (0.0868) (0.218)
Treatmentx
Non-Native Liberian 0.0286 -0.168* 0.120 -0.361
(0.0401) (0.0950) (0.111) (0.268)
Treatment x
Native Liberian -0.0236 0.134 0.0760 0.424
(0.0400) (0.133) (0.107) (0.363)
Treatment x








Discrimination Index -0.485 -1.032
(0.453) (1.178)
Controls X X X X X X X X
Time Fixed Effects X X X X X X X X
Control Mean 0.120 0.120 0.120 0.120 0.255 0.255 0.255 0.255
Observations 604 604 586 586 604 604 586 586
Standard errors are in parentheses and are robust. Controls include employment at baseline, sector,
counties of operation, origin and gender of the owner, geographical zone, and baseline information
on bids submitted. The discrimination index was computed with fitted values of a logit regression of
the dummy variable that equals one when the firm reported discrimination at baseline, on baseline
characteristics. The estimates of the parameters were computed using the treatment group, and
the fitted values were computed for the entire sample. All regressions include the discrimination
index as well as the interaction between the discrimination index and whether the firm is Native
Liberian. Time fixed effects are at the month level.
127
Table 3.10: How Treatment Affects Firms’ Bidding Behavior
Won a Contract Through
a Tender in The Past 6 Months (Y/N)
Number of Contracts Won Through
a Tender In the Past 6 Months
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Treatment 0.0260 -0.0604 0.0740 -0.117
(0.0214) (0.0392) (0.0476) (0.0915)
Treatmentx
Non-Native Liberian 0.0434* -0.102** 0.110* -0.183**
(0.0261) (0.0462) (0.0583) (0.0930)
Treatment x
Native Liberian -0.00353 -0.0373 0.0130 -0.0988
(0.0232) (0.0692) (0.0493) (0.186)
Treatment x








Discrimination Index 0.0970 0.324
(0.207) (0.566)
Controls X X X X X X X X
Time Fixed Effects X X X X X X X X
Control Mean 0.033 0.033 0.033 0.033 0.052 0.052 0.052 0.052
Observations 1304 1304 1267 1267 1304 1304 1267 1267
Standard errors are in parentheses and are robust. Controls include employment at baseline, sector,
counties of operation, origin and gender of the owner, geographical zone, and baseline information
on bids submitted. The discrimination index was computed with fitted values of a logit regression of
the dummy variable that equals one when the firm reported discrimination at baseline, on baseline
characteristics. The estimates of the parameters were computed using the treatment group, and
the fitted values were computed for the entire sample. All regressions include the discrimination
index as well as the interaction between the discrimination index and whether the firm is Native
Liberian. Time fixed effects are at the month level.
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Appendix A
Appendix to Chapter 1
A.1 Balance Table
Table A.1 is the balance table for treatment and control groups after the first randomization.
The balance table for the first randomization shows that treatment and control groups
are balanced. Average speed seems to be slightly different between treatment and control,
though at a low level of significance (10%). The difference in average speed is of 3 kilometers
per hour, which is low compared to the estimated effects of treatment.
A.2 Additional Specifications
A.2.0.1 Effect by type of breaks
Comparing the data from the driver interviews and the manager interviews shows some
information asymmetry. While tables 1.3 and 1.4 show similar estimates, tables A.2 and
A.3 show that the managers under estimate the effect of the GPS trackers on the length of
breaks. Without a GPS tracker, the total time of a trip is easy to estimate for a manager
(because he knows when the driver leaves and when the driver arrives). But the time spent
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on breaks is a pure guess. In this section, we explore this further, by looking at the reason
for breaks.
Evidence confirms a dis-alignment of incentives between the driver and the manager.
Table A.4 shows the effect of the GPS tracker on breaks by reasons for stopping. As
before, columns (1), (2) and (3) show the IV estimate, and columns (4), (5) and (6) show
the Intent to Treat estimates. Column (1) and (4) show the effect of treatment on “mud
breaks” - when the truck has to stop because he is stuck in mud (or the truck in front of him
is stuck in the mud). Column (2) and (5) show the effect of treatment “delivery breaks”,
and (3) and (6) on personal breaks.
Estimates of table A.4 show that most of the effect comes from the drivers taking less
personal breaks. It also shows that part of the effect comes from being less stuck in the mud.
This could seem surprising since there is no reason why the treatment would affect the time
spent in the mud. However, drivers are probably adjusting their answers when they have a
GPS tracker.
A.2.0.2 Propensity to be treated score
Table A.5 presents the logit regression of treatment take-up on baseline characteristics of
drivers or of manager-driver pairs (such as matching county of origin). The fitted values
of this regression generate the “propensity to be treated” score, used in the heterogeneity
analysis.
A.2.0.3 Effect of treatment on productivity and relations
Columns (1) and (2) of table A.6 show the overall effect of the assignment to treatment on
the propensity of the driver to follow the rules of the business and to take care of the truck
(as measured by managers). Columns (3) and (4) of table A.6 show the overall effect of the
assignment to treatment on the relationship between the driver and the manager, and on
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trust (as measured by the manager). All these coefficients are negative but small and not
significant. This table shows that by not measuring the heterogeneity among workers (which
is explored in the main text), the treatment appears to have no effect on these variables.
Table A.7 shows the effect of treatment on the driver’s perception of his work in the firm.
Except for the first column, results are small and not significant. The first column, however,
shows that treatment has an overall negative impact (and significant at the 10% level) on
the driver’s perception of the firm.
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Table A.1: Balance Table
Diff(T-C) Std. Err. T-Stat P-Val
Managers
How many trucks does the firm own? -2.10 1.93 -1.09 0.28
Is transport the main activity? -0.04 0.07 -0.67 0.50
Is the firm officily registered? 0.08 0.06 1.23 0.22
Does the firm deliver goods outside the country? -0.12 0.08 -1.52 0.13
Gender of the interviewee (Male=0; Female=1) 0.02 0.01 1.48 0.14
Is the manager Liberian? 0.05 0.03 1.55 0.12
Is the manager a driver? -0.04 0.07 -0.64 0.52
Does your business hire carboys? 0.08 0.09 0.95 0.34
How many tires did your business purchased last month? 1.09 0.92 1.19 0.24
Did the firm ever pay for overloading? 0.03 0.08 0.42 0.67
Has this firm ever been a victim of theft? 0.12 0.09 1.35 0.18
Is the firm based in Monrovia? 0.05 0.07 0.77 0.44
Drivers always assigned to same truck -0.03 0.04 -0.95 0.34
Trucks
Truck was second-hand when bought 0.01 0.06 0.13 0.90
Maintenance in the past month (USD): -18.59 194.67 -0.10 0.92
Price of truck when bought (1k USD) -2.73 4.73 -0.58 0.57
Drivers
Did you ever had an accident? -0.04 0.09 -0.46 0.65
Driver wage (in USD per day): -0.19 0.40 -0.46 0.64
Trips
Distance of trip (km) -6.29 23.03 -0.27 0.79
Time spent on trips (hours) -6.28 4.78 -1.31 0.19
Average speed (km/h) 3.62 2.00 1.81 0.07
Time of trip spent on breaks (hours) 3.93 3.99 0.98 0.33
Percentage of trip spent on breaks (%) 2.40 2.90 0.83 0.41
This table is based on data collected during interviews of managers at baseline. Baseline interviews were
collected between August and October 2016, which corresponds to the rainy season. In the case where several
managers were interviewed in the same firm, the answers from the oldest manager were retained.
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Table A.2: Effect of Treatment on Breaks (as a % of trip time) - MANAGER Interviews
Instrumental Variable Reduced Form













Treatment -13.43* -16.01** -13.14*
(7.013) (7.911) (7.017)
Assignemnt to Treatment -5.140* -8.642 -7.469
(2.697) (6.445) (6.436)
Season FE X X X X
Driver FE X X X X
Road FE X X X X
Trip Controls X X
Observations 188 188 188 188 188 188
Standard errors are in parentheses and are robust.
* p<.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01
139
Table A.3: Effect of Treatment on Breaks (as a % of trip time) - DRIVER Interviews
Instrumental Variable Reduced Form













Treatment -6.049** -19.88*** -21.36***
(2.621) (5.347) (5.653)
Assignemnt to Treatment -3.447** -9.913* -10.14*
(1.447) (5.284) (5.441)
Season FE X X X X
Driver FE X X X X
Road FE X X X X
Trip Controls X X
Observations 291 291 291 291 291 291
Standard are errors in parentheses and robust.
* p<.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01
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Table A.4: Effect of Treatment on Breaks Reason (as a % of trip time) - DRIVER Interviews
Instrumental Variable Reduced Form













Treatment -8.761* 2.651 -15.25***
(4.527) (2.713) (4.890)
Assignemnt to Treatment -4.158 1.258 -7.237
(4.051) (2.465) (4.817)
Season FE X X X X X X
Driver FE X X X X X X
Road FE X X X X X X
Trip Controls X X X X X X
Observations 291 291 291 291 291 291
Standard errors are in parentheses and are robust.
* p<.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01
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Manager and driver have the same origin -0.549
(0.419)
Number of accidents past year 0.846**
(0.422)
Relation with driver (0-10) -0.0712
(0.171)




Other Baseline Characteristics X
Observations 143
Standard errors in parentheses.
* p<.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01
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Table A.6: Effect of Monitoring on Manager-Driver Relations
Manager Interviews
(1) (2) (3) (4)








Assignment to Treatment -0.167 -0.0272 -0.0879 -0.0563
(0.198) (0.291) (0.230) (0.217)
Round FE X X X X
Driver FE X X X X
Observations 622 622 622 622
Standard errors are in parentheses and are clustered at the company-round level.
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Table A.7: Effect of Monitoring on Manager-Driver Relations
Manager Interviews
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Likes the Firm
Rate (0-10)
Likes Being a driver
Rate (0-10)




Treatment -1.029* 0.123 0.629 -0.564
(0.520) (0.526) (0.389) (0.516)
Round FE X X X X
Driver FE X X X X
Observations 249 259 259 245
Standard errors are in parentheses and are clustered at the company-round level.
* p<.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01
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Appendix B
Appendix to Chapter 2
B.1 An alternative way of defining origin markets
Markets of production were determined using different methods for different commodities.
Liberia has only one port of entry which is in Monrovia, the capital, and little to no land-
trade, so that the market of origin for imported commodities is simply Monrovia.
For each commodity produced locally, the main markets of production were determined
using the household survey. In the survey, households report which commodities they pro-
duce, and for what value. For each commodity, the main production markets were the
markets with the biggest production, with a cumulative value representing more than 75%
of the country’s production. For coal, the value produced was not reported so the same
algorithm determined production markets of coal, using the time spent on the field. For
each market, the market of origin of the commodity is the closest market of one of the main
production counties. This method for determining the local production was confirmed by
informal interviews with local sellers. Compared to what is done in the literature (Atkin
and Donaldson 2015 called producers to ask for the origin of the commodities sold in each
market), this method can be replicated easily.
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Figure B.1: Price gaps and distance
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Figure B.2: Price gaps and distance
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Log distance to origin (miles) 0.0399*** 0.128*** 0.124***
(0.00235) (0.00793) (0.00894)
Observations 43708 2587 2242
Adjusted R2 0.382 0.398 0.979
* p<.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01. Standard errors in parentheses. Standard errors are clustered at the time-
product level. Column (1) uses data on the absolute price gap between all pairs of markets. Column (2)
uses data on the price gap between trading pairs, as determined by production markets estimated with the
household survey production. Column (3) uses the price-gap adjusted with pass-through.
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B.2 Additional Table
Table B.2: Estimating the effect of travel time on intra-national trade costs: Google estimates






Log travel time 0.142*** 0.149***
(0.0200) (0.0198)
Observations 1366 1366
Adjusted R2 0.962 0.963
* p<.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01. Standard errors in parentheses. Standard errors are clustered at the time-
product level. This table shows regressions of the adjusted price gap between trading locations on travel




Appendix to Chapter 3
C.1 Additional Tables
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Table C.1: Summary Statistics of Restricted Sample
Mean SD Observations
Sectors
Construction and Renovation 0.25 (0.43) 828
Food and Beverages 0.16 (0.36) 828
Home Essentials 0.13 (0.34) 828
Handicrafts and Artisans 0.12 (0.32) 828
Business and Consulting Services 0.10 (0.30) 828
Owner Nationality
Liberian 0.92 (0.28) 828
Lebanese 0.04 (0.20) 828
Nigerian 0.01 (0.11) 828
Indian 0.01 (0.12) 828
Other
Total Number of Employees 15.11 (45.69) 825
Submitted a bid in the past 6 months (Y=1; N=0) 0.22 (0.41) 587
Number of bids submitted in the past 6 months 0.70 (1.65) 587
Won a contract through a bid in the past 6 months (Y=1; N=0) 0.13 (0.34) 609
Number of contracts won through bids in the past 6 months 0.35 (1.31) 609
Ever won a contract of six months or more 0.73 (0.45) 119
Proportion of bids won (conditional on applying) 0.33 (0.37) 129
Speaks at least one Liberian local language 0.36 (0.48) 828
This table presents summary statistics of firms who responded to the endline survey. The
data is based on phone interviews conducted by Building Markets, a Liberian local NGO.
A nationality of the business is determined if at least one of the owners has that particular
nationality. The number of employees includes the owner or manager of the firm.
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Table C.2: Balance Table of Restricted Sample
Diff.
(T - C) Std. Error P-Val.
Sectors
Construction and Renovation 0.0073 0.0313 0.8165
Food and Beverages -0.0179 0.0263 0.4961
Home Essentials -0.0228 0.0243 0.3475
Handicrafts and Artisans -0.0084 0.0234 0.7186
Business and Consulting Services -0.0177 0.0216 0.4123
Owner Nationality
Liberian 0.0143 0.0201 0.4796
Lebanese -0.0038 0.0144 0.7926
Nigerian 0.0051 0.0083 0.5395
Indian 0.0017 0.0087 0.8403
Other
Total Number of Employees 1.6770 3.3153 0.6131
Submitted a bid in the past 6 months (Y=1; N=0) 0.0175 0.0357 0.6233
Number of bids submitted in the past 6 months 0.0593 0.1421 0.6766
Won a contract through a bid in the past 6 months (Y=1; N=0) 0.0090 0.0287 0.7546
Number of contracts won through bids in the past 6 months -0.1621 0.1100 0.1412
Ever won a contract of six months or more -0.0084 0.0879 0.9236
Proportion of bids won (conditional on applying) 0.0314 0.0685 0.6478
Speaks at least one Liberian local language 0.0380 0.0347 0.2746
This table presents balance between firms of the treatment and control groups, for firms
who responded to the endline survey. The data is based on phone interviews conducted by
Building Markets, a Liberian local NGO. A nationality of the business is determined if at
least one of the owners has that particular nationality. The number of employees includes
the owner or manager of the firm.
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Table C.3: Differential Attrition
Not Interviewed Interviewed Diff. P-Val.
Sectors
Construction and Renovation 0.20 0.25 -0.0537∗∗ 0.0431
Food and Beverages 0.16 0.16 0.0008 0.9722
Home Essentials 0.12 0.13 -0.0083 0.6901
Handicrafts and Artisans 0.11 0.12 -0.0112 0.5765
Business and Consulting Services 0.08 0.10 -0.0221 0.2248
Owner Nationality
Liberian 0.87 0.92 -0.0418∗∗ 0.0248
Lebanese 0.05 0.04 0.0139 0.2889
Nigerian 0.04 0.01 0.0224∗∗ 0.0111
Indian 0.01 0.01 -0.0090 0.1844
Other
Total Number of Employees 12.08 15.11 -3.0330 0.2592
Submitted a bid in the past 6 months (Y=1; N=0) 0.17 0.22 -0.0467 0.1212
Number of bids submitted in the past 6 months 0.55 0.70 -0.1429 0.2352
Won a contract through a bid in the past 6 months (Y=1; N=0) 0.09 0.13 -0.0431∗ 0.0706
Number of contracts won through bids in the past 6 months 0.19 0.35 -0.1555∗ 0.0679
Ever won a contract of six months or more 0.82 0.73 0.0856 0.2080
Proportion of bids won (conditional on applying) 0.29 0.33 -0.0363 0.5717
Speaks at least one Liberian local language 0.30 0.36 -0.0538∗ 0.0718
Treatment Group 0.67 0.64 0.0287 0.3399
This table presents differential attrition between firms who responded to endline interviews
and firms who did not. The data is based on phone interviews conducted by Building
Markets, a Liberian local NGO. A nationality of the business is determined if at least one
of the owners has that particular nationality. The number of employees includes the owner
or manager of the firm.
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Table C.4: Effect of Treatment on Firm Behavior - Treatment on the Treated
























Training 0.443 0.319** 0.666* 0.985** 0.389*** 0.358**
(0.279) (0.161) (0.350) (0.396) (0.129) (0.148)
Controls X X X X X X
Control Mean 0.255 0.083 0.310 0.394 0.176 0.231
Observations 604 604 604 604 604 604
Standard errors are in parentheses and are robust. Controls include employment at baseline, sector,
counties of operation, origin and gender of the owner, geographical zone, and baseline information
on bids submitted. The first four variables are evaluated in the 6 months preceding the interview.
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